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LIST OF PARTIES
The following is a complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose
order is sought to be reviewed:
Mariposa Express, Inc.; Cold Spring Investments, LLC; Cold Spring
Investments No. 1, Limited Partnership; Cold Spring Investments No. 2, Limited
Partnership; Newburyport Capital, LLC; Hannah Enterprises, Inc.; USS Holdings,
LLC; USS Columbia, LLC; Metro Mar Ventures LLC; Michael Jones, LLC; Stirling
LLC; Michaelson Ventures Inc.; USS O'Brien, Inc.; USS Highland Park, Inc.; Sharon
McWilliams; George Ammirato; William Demet; Robert Harris; Michael Jones; Ted
Michaelson; Jim O'Brien; and Stefan Triandafilou (collectively, the "Mariposa Group"
or "Appellants").1
United Shipping Solutions, LLC ("USS"); USS Logistics, LLC ("USSL"); Robert
Ross, Charles Derr; and Jesse Moore (collectively, the "USS Parties" or "Appellees").

Following the issuance of the arbitrator's decision in an arbitration between the
parties that concluded in February 2012 and the filing of Appellants' brief, Appellants
Sharon Mc Williams, Mariposa Express, Inc., Ted Michaelson, Stirling LLC, and
Michaelson Ventures, Inc. indicated, through counsel, that they were no longer
participating in any post-arbitration motions or other issues related to the dispute between
the parties. Ms. Mc Williams and Mariposa Express, Inc. paid to the USS Parties the
amounts determined by the arbitrator and have committed to pay their portions of the
attorneys' fees and costs determined by the arbitrator. Similarly, Mr. Michaelson,
Stirling LLC and Michaelson Ventures, Inc. have accepted the amounts determined by
the arbitrator and have made payments and payment arrangements (including executing
promissory notes) with the USS Parties to pay those amounts. Accordingly, it is the USS
Parties' understanding that Ms. Mc Williams, Mariposa Express, Inc., Mr. Michaelson,
Stirling LLC, and Michaelson Ventures, Inc. are no longer participating in this appeal.
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L JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)0) (Supp. 2011).
II. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Whether the district court correctly granted the USS Parties' Motion to
Compel Mandatory Arbitration (the "Motion") by holding that the parties9 dispute was
subject to the mandatory arbitration provision of the parties' settlement agreement.
Standard of Review: "[W]hether a trial court correctly decided a motion to
compel arbitration is a question of law which [the Court] review[s] for correctness,
according no deference to the trial judge." Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. ParkwestAssocs.,
2002UT3,1|l0,40P.3d599. 2
Preservation for Appeal: The USS Parties do not dispute that Appellants
preserved the above issue for appeal. To the extent Appellants are seeking to argue
matters beyond the issue set forth above, the USS Parties do not agree that Appellants
preserved those matters for appeal.

The issue on appeal concerns only whether the district court correctly granted the
USS Parties' Motion. The USS Parties' Motion was not brought pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Nor did the Mariposa Group raise the
district court's dismissal as an issue for appeal. Therefore, contrary to the Mariposa
Group's argument, the standard of review governing motions to dismiss does not apply,
and the only standard of review applicable to this appeal is the standard for the review of
motions to compel arbitration.
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III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OR
PROVISIONS CENTRAL TO THIS APPEAL
Utah Code Ann, § 78B-11-108(1): "On motion of a person showing an agreement
to arbitrate and alleging another person's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement...
the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate
unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate."
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-108(4): "The court may not refuse to order arbitration
because the claim subject to arbitration lacks merit or grounds for the claim have not
been established."
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-107(2): "The court shall decide whether an agreement
to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate."
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-107(3): "An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition
precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable."
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below
From February 16, 2011 to June 2011, and pursuant to a settlement agreement

between the USS Parties and a group of former franchisees (the "Mariposa Franchisees"),
the USS Parties attempted to have the Mariposa Franchisees identify what amounts, if
any, they disputed as owing to the USS Parties under an indemnification provision in the
parties' settlement agreement. When certain of the Mariposa Franchisees (the Mariposa
Group) took the position that they owed nothing under the indemnification provision, the

USS Parties sent a "Dispute Notice," which, under the settlement agreement, triggered an
expedited arbitration process. On July 12, 2011, and in anticipation of that notice, the
Mariposa Group filed a complaint ("the Complaint") in Third District Court, seeking to
avoid the arbitration process to which they had agreed.
On August 1, 2011, the USS Parties filed the Motion, asking the district court to
compel arbitration of the parties' dispute. The Mariposa Group filed an opposition to the
Motion and, after full briefing, the district court heard oral argument on the Motion on
August 19, 2011. (See R. 807 (Transcript of Oral Argument regarding Motion), a full
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.) At the end of the hearing, the district
court determined that, as a matter of law, the terms of the settlement agreement required
the parties to resolve their dispute through the arbitration procedure contained in the
settlement agreement. (R. 807 at 28:7-20) ("I think [the arbitration provisions of the
settlement agreement] are broad enough to allow for the kinds of information [the
Mariposa Group] think[s] they need to see

So I think as a matter of law, that's the

way I see and~and read this—this agreement to engage in arbitration.").3 The district

3

The Mariposa Group correctly notes that the district court made no findings of
fact, but claims that the court treated the motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and
"did not consider any documents outside of the pleadings . . . . " (Aplts.' Brief at 3).
Both contentions are incorrect, but ultimately irrelevant.
On a motion to compel arbitration, a district court is not limited to the standard of
review imposed by Rule 12(b)(6). The court may consider evidence and make findings
of fact as necessary. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §78B-11-107 & 108. In this case, while
the district court considered the materials submitted by the parties (see R. 807 at 11:1619; Order at 2, attached hereto as Exhibit C), it concluded that no findings of fact were
(continued...)
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court entered a formal written order memorializing its ruling on September 6, 2011 (the
"Order"). The Order provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "The Motion is granted.
The parties are ordered to arbitrate their dispute in accordance with the arbitration
procedures set forth in Paragraph I.e. of the Settlement Agreement." (See Order,
attached hereto as Exhibit C.) The Mariposa Group filed a Notice of Appeal on
September 16, 20ll. 4

(... continued)
necessary because the parties' dispute, no matter how it was characterized by the
Mariposa Group, was, as a matter of law, subject to the arbitration provision of the
Settlement Agreement. (R. 807 at 28:4-10; 18-20). In other words, regardless of whether
the dispute concerned the question of whether the Mariposa Group's indemnification
obligation had been triggered or whether the Mariposa Group owed any or all of the
amounts alleged by the USS Parties, the dispute was within the scope of the arbitration
provision. Given this, the district court's order dismissing the case was not a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal, as the Mariposa Group claims, but a recognition that the dispute was
not properly before the court and had to be dismissed in favor of arbitration.
The Appellants' attempt to cast the district court in an unfavorable light by
asserting that the district court did not review the documents submitted by the parties is
unfair. (See Aplts.' Brief at 3.) Specifically, the Mariposa Group cites to the following
statement by the district court and implies that the court did not read the materials
submitted by the parties: "Well, to be quite honest with everybody, I didn't read all this
stuff, I flipped through it." (Id.) What the district court was referring to in this statement
was not the briefing, the Complaint, or the Settlement Agreement. Rather, the court was
referencing certain of the exhibits attached to the parties' briefing.
4

After the Mariposa Group filed its Notice of Appeal (and after some further
delay by the Mariposa Group), the parties ultimately arbitrated their dispute before an
agreed-upon arbitrator on January 31, February 7, and February 13, 2012. On February
22, 2012, the arbitrator issued a Memorandum Decision ordering the Mariposa Group to
pay the USS Parties $1,162,320.08, plus costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. On
February 28, 2012 (six days after the Memorandum Decision), the Mariposa Group filed
their opening appellate brief.

B.

Statement of the Facts
1. The Mariposa Franchisees Fail to Pay USS for Shipping Services Provided by
DHL, and USS Is Forced to Pay for Those Services.
USS owns a franchise system that resells shipping services. Prior to November

2008, each of the Mariposa Group owned one or more franchises in the USS franchise
system and resold shipping services to customers, using discounted rates USS and its
affiliate USS Logistics, LLC ("USSL") had negotiated with third-party shipping carriers.
(R. 4-5, 149, 192-93). The primary provider of domestic and international shipping
services to the USS franchise system was DHL Express (USA), Inc. ("DHL"), which
provided these services to the USS franchise system under a reseller agreement (the
"Reseller Agreement") with USSL. (R. 149, 172). Under the Reseller Agreement and
the franchise agreements between the franchisees and USS, each franchisee was required
to pay USS for the services provided by DHL, and USS then tendered a collective
payment for the franchise system to DHL. (R. 149, 175).
In 2008, DHL decided to cease domestic shipping operations in the United States
and, on November 10, 2008, breached the Reseller Agreement by announcing that it
would discontinue all express and ground shipping services in the United States by
January 30, 2009. (R. 5, 149). Following DHL's announcement, the Mariposa
Franchisees unilaterally decided to stop paying USS for the DHL shipping services
provided to their customers, even though their customers continued to ship with DHL.
(R. 150). As a result of their non-payment, USS terminated the franchises of the
Mariposa Franchisees. (Id).
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2. The DHL Lawsuit and the Mariposa Lawsuit.
On December 22, 2008, USSL, and in a later amended complaint USS and certain
of its franchisees, filed suit against DHL in Utah State Court, entitled USS Logistics,
LLC, et al v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., Case No. 080926254 (the "DHL Lawsuit"). In
the DHL Lawsuit, USS and USSL alleged, among other things, that DHL had breached
the Reseller Agreement and caused the USS franchise system to incur significant
damages. (R. 150, 192-93). DHL answered the complaint and asserted a counterclaim
against USSL, claiming that USSL was liable for the unpaid shipping services which the
Mariposa Franchisees and their customers received, but for which they had not paid. (R.
150, 193). On March 31, 2009, the Mariposa Franchisees filed their own lawsuit against
DHL in New York Supreme Court (the "Franchisee Lawsuit"), claiming that DHL was
liable to the Mariposa Franchisees for breaching the Reseller Agreement. (R. 5, 150,
193).
In anticipation of the DHL Lawsuit, on December 3, 2008, the Mariposa
Franchisees filed a lawsuit against the USS Parties in Utah State Court, entitled Mariposa
Express, Inc., et al v. United Shipping Solutions, etaL, Case No. 080925017 (the
"Mariposa Lawsuit"). (R. 5, 151, 192). In the Mariposa Lawsuit, the Mariposa
Franchisees sought to avoid all of their franchise obligations under their franchise
agreements with USS. (R. 151). The USS Parties answered the complaint and
counterclaimed, seeking to enforce the franchise obligations of the Mariposa Franchisees

and to obtain payment for unpaid freight and DHL shipments provided to them and their
customers under the USS franchise system. (R. 151,192, 268).
On December 16, 2008, the district court in the Mariposa Lawsuit entered a
temporary restraining order (the "TRO") which required, among other things, that
(1) "[The Mariposa Franchisees] shall not further solicit employees of [USS and USSL]";
(2) "[The Mariposa Franchisees] are not relieved of any other post-termination
obligations and shall not use or disclose any of [USS or USSL's] confidential or
proprietary information in any way"; (3) "[The Mariposa Franchisees] shall discontinue
all use of [USS and USSL's] trademarks and any claimed association with [their]
franchise system." (R. 151, 308).
On June 9, 2009, and because of evidence indicating that the Mariposa
Franchisees had violated the TRO, the district court entered an Order Regarding Motion
for Order to Show Cause Why Plaintiffs Should Not Be Held in Civil Contempt for
Violating This Court's Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Sanctioned in Connection Therewith. (R. 151-52,314). In the order to show
cause, the district court enjoined the Mariposa Franchisees "from using or charging
shipments to USS's accounts with its shipping providers." (R. 152). The court also
scheduled an evidentiary hearing to determine whether certain of the Mariposa
Franchisees should be held in contempt and, if so, the appropriate sanction. (Id).
On September 1, 2009, the district court held the evidentiary hearing in the
Mariposa Lawsuit. At the end of the hearing, the district court ruled that certain of the
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Mariposa Franchisees, in particular Robert Harris and Sharon Mc Williams—both parties
to this case—violated the TRO. (R. 152, 354). After granting the motion for contempt,
the district court took under advisement the question of the appropriate sanctions to
impose and proceeded with a multi-day evidentiary hearing on the parties' cross-motions
for preliminary injunction. (R. 153, 354). Near the end of that hearing, but before the
district court had imposed contempt sanctions, the Mariposa Franchisees approached the
USS Parties about settling the Mariposa Lawsuit. (R. 153).
3. The Parties Enter into the Settlement Agreement and Agree to Resolve
Disputes through Expedited Arbitration.
On September 15, 2009, the USS Parties and the Mariposa Franchisees settled the
Mariposa Lawsuit by entering into a settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement").
(R. 6, 197; see also Settlement Agreement, attached as Exhibit A to Aplts.' Brief). In the
Settlement Agreement, the Mariposa Franchisees agreed, among other things, to make
three types of payments to the USS Parties. Specifically, the Mariposa Franchisees
agreed to pay the USS Parties a settlement payment. (R. 197; see also Settlement
Agreement f 4). In addition, the Mariposa Franchisees agreed to pay USS for all
amounts owing for unpaid freight shipments made by them or their customers. (R. 153,
193; Settlement Agreement Tf 1). Finally, the Mariposa Franchisees agreed to indemnify
the USS Parties against any amounts the LFSS Parties were determined to owe DHL for
unpaid shipping services provided to the Mariposa Franchisees or their customers,
regardless of whether that determination was through judgment or settlement of the DHL
Lawsuit. (R. 6, 154, 196; Settlement Agreement ^f 3). All other matters between the

parties were resolved and the Mariposa Lawsuit was dismissed. (R. 6,153,200;
Settlement Agreement T| 8).
To determine the outstanding amount owing for freight services, the parties agreed
in the Settlement Agreement that the USS Parties would provide the Mariposa
Franchisees with access to certain shipping data (the "CAMS Data").5 (R. 153, 193-94;
Settlement Agreement ^ 1 .a). After disclosure of the CAMS Data, the Mariposa
Franchisees were given time to review that data and indicate whether they disputed the
amounts showing in the CAMS Data. (R. 193-94; Settlement Agreement *f La). If a
dispute arose, and because the USS Parties did not want to incur the expense and time
associated with further litigation to resolve any disputes, the USS Parties insisted, and the
Mariposa Franchisees agreed, that any dispute concerning the freight amounts, including
whether any amount was owed at all, would "be fully and finally resolved exclusively by
binding arbitration," as set forth in Paragraph 1(c) of the Settlement Agreement—the
mandatory arbitration provision. (R. 154, 195; Settlement Agreement f l.c).
With regard to the Mariposa Franchisees' indemnification obligation to the USS
Parties, Paragraph 3 of the Settlement Agreement provides as follows:
[T]he respective Mariposa Franchisees agree to indemnify and hold USS
harmless for any and all amounts the USS Parties are determined to owe
5

The Settlement Agreement defines CAMS Data as "copies of the [USS]
corporate payment screen and open franchise invoices for their respective franchises,
showing the amounts USS believes each Mariposa Franchisee owes for . . . Services
provided to each respective Mariposa Franchisee and/or his, her or its customers (the
"CAMS Data"). (R. 193; Settlement Agreement f La.).
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DHL through judgment or settlement for DHL services provided to the
respective Mariposa Franchisees and/or their customers and which the
respective Mariposa Franchisees or their customers have not already paid to
USS or DHL {regardless of whether that determination is by judgment or
through settlement and regardless of whether the amount is determined
through set-off amounts that may reduce any judgment in favor of the USS
Parties and against DHL). The respective Mariposa Franchisees further
agree to pay to USS all royalties, Wasatch Billing fees, and late fees charged
by DHL resulting from non-payment by the respective Mariposa
Franchisees, on the shipments the USS Parties are determined to owe to
DHL.
(R. 154, 196; Settlement Agreement If 3) (emphases added). As with the unpaid freight
amounts, the parties agreed that, for purposes of determining any amounts owed by the
Mariposa Franchisees for DHL shipments under the indemnification provision, the USS
Parties would "provide the Mariposa Franchisees with access to the CAMS D a t a . . .
necessary to show the DHL Services provided to the Mariposa Franchisees and/or their
customers.5' (R. 154-55, 196; Settlement Agreement Tf3.a). Again, because the USS
Parties wanted to avoid a ftirther lawsuit in the event of any dispute concerning amounts
owing under the indemnification provision, the USS Parties insisted and the Mariposa
Franchisees agreed that any disputes concerning the amounts owed to the USS Parties
under the indemnification provision, including whether any amount was owed, would be
resolved through the same expedited arbitration procedure used to resolve freight
disputes:
If the Mariposa Franchisees do not agree with the amount identified by
the USS Parties, the USS Parties shall nevertheless have the right to
proceed with the settlement and any dispute between the USS Parties and
the Mariposa Franchisees concerning these amounts shall be resolved in
accordance with the dispute resolution procedure set forth in Paragraph
Lc above. Likewise, if the USS Parties are determined to owe DHL,

through a judgment, any amount for services provided to the Mariposa
Franchisees and/or their customers, any dispute between the USS Parties
and the Mariposa Franchisees concerning such amounts shall be
resolve[d] in accordance with the dispute resolution procedure set forth in
Paragraph l.c above. In the event of such a dispute, the USS Parties shall
provide the Mariposa Franchisees with access to the CAMS Data (of the
same type and nature set forth in Paragraph 1 above) necessary to show the
DHL Services provided to the Mariposa Franchisees and/or their customers.
(R. 155, 196; Settlement Agreement % 3.a) (emphases added).
The "dispute resolution procedures" applicable to freight disputes and disputes
concerning the Mariposa Franchisees' indemnification obligation are set forth in
Paragraph Lc of the Settlement Agreement (R. 155,195; Settlement Agreement ^ Lc).
That provision also requires that "any dispute" be resolved "exclusively by binding
arbitration" and on an expedited basis. Specifically, Paragraph 1 x. provides:
Dispute Resolution Procedure. The Parties agree that any dispute
regarding [indemnification]6 will be fully andfinally resolved exclusively
by binding arbitration, as set forth in this provision.
i.
If USS and any Mariposa Franchisee are unable to
resolve any dispute regarding the amount owed by a Mariposa
Franchisee under Section 1 .a above, within ten (10) days after USS
has delivered the Dispute Notice to such franchisee, the parties shall
submit the matter to binding arbitration before one forensic
accountant, who shall review the parties' documentation and
establish the amount owed to USS, if any, on any disputed invoices.
The accountant will be selected by USS and the Mariposa
Franchisee within twenty (20) days following delivery of the Dispute
Notice.

6

Paragraph Lc refers to "Freight Payments." However, Paragraph l.c is also
incorporated into Paragraph 3.a for purposes of addressing disputes about the
indemnification.
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ii.
The Parties agree that any arbitration under this
Paragraph 1 shall be conducted within forty (40) days following
delivery of the Dispute Notice.
iii.
Following the entry of an arbitration award, the
Mariposa Franchisee shall pay to USS one-third of all amounts
determined to be owing within ten (10) days and pay the remainder
in accordance with Paragraph 1 .b above.
iv.
The Parties agree that the prevailing party in any
arbitration conducted pursuant to this Paragraph 1 shall be entitled to
recover his, her or its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
the arbitration. The Parties agree that a party shall be deemed a
"prevailing party" if the arbitrator determines that the disputed
amount is closer to the amount claimed to be due by that party than
by the other party.
(R. 156, 195; Settlement Agreement ^f l.c) (emphasis added).
4. USSL Is Held Liable in the DHL Lawsuit for All Unpaid Shipments Provided
by DHL.
Following the execution of the Settlement Agreement, USS and USSL continued to
pursue the DHL litigation. (R. 156). In September 2010, DHL moved for partial
summary judgment on its counterclaim that USSL was liable to DHL for all unpaid
shipping amounts, including all amounts the Mariposa Franchisees had not paid. (Id).
On October 13, 2010, the district court granted DHL's motion, ruling that USSL was
liable to DHL for all unpaid shipping amounts for services provided to the USS franchise
system. (R. 157, 361-362; Memorandum Decision at 6-7, also attached hereto as
Exhibit D). The district court left the question of the amount owing to DHL for those
services for trial. (R. 362; Memorandum Decision at 7).

Following the district court's ruling on DHL's Motion, DHL and the USS Parties
entered into settlement negotiations and eventually executed a settlement agreement to
resolve the DHL Lawsuit (the "DHL Agreement"). (R. 157). During the negotiations
leading up to that agreement, DHL insisted that any amount paid to the USS Parties be
reduced by the amounts owing to DHL for unpaid shipments. (Id). As such, in the DHL
Agreement, the USS Parties received payment from DHL in an amount that was offset by
the amounts owing to DHL for unpaid shipping services, including the amounts owing
due to the Mariposa Franchisees' failure to pay. (R. 142, 157).
5. The USS Parties Notify the Mariposa Franchisees of the DHL Agreement, and
the Mariposa Group Attempts to Avoid Their Indemnification Obligation and
Arbitration.
After entering into the DHL Agreement, the USS Parties informed the Mariposa
o

Franchisees of that agreement by letter dated February 16, 2011. In that letter, the USS
Parties notified the Mariposa Franchisees of their indemnification obligation and, as they
had previously done with the freight shipments, provided the Mariposa Franchisees with
7

At DHL's insistence, the DHL Agreement contains a confidentiality provision
that requires the terms of the DHL Agreement to be maintained in confidence unless
DHL consents to disclosure or unless disclosure is required by process of law. (R. 157).
o

In actuality, the Mariposa Franchisees were aware of the settlement between the
USS Parties and DHL as early as October 18, 2010, as their counsel was present in the
courtroom when the settlement was announced to the court in the DHL Lawsuit. (R.
157). Counsel for the Mariposa Franchisees discussed the settlement with counsel for the
USS Parties. (R. 807 at 26:25 to 27:1-6). Contrary to the Mariposa Group's claim, at
that time counsel for the Mariposa Franchisees never asserted that the USS Parties had
failed to give them notice of the settlement or access to the CAMS Data. (See R. 482).

71369071.4 0063437-00013

13

the CAMS Data for each of their respective franchises, showing the amounts owing for
unpaid DHL services. (R. 158, 369).
On March 7, 2011, the Mariposa Franchisees responded by letter. (R. 159, 482).
Rather than disputing the amounts showing in the CAMS Data, the Mariposa Franchisees
merely stated they needed additional "information about the settlement," without
specifying what information they were requesting. (R. 159, 482). As a result, on March
9, 2011, and in a further attempt to identify whether the Mariposa Franchisees disputed
their indemnification obligation, the USS Parties sent a second letter, providing the
Mariposa Franchisees with information about the DHL settlement, including that "USS
and USSL received payment in an amount that was offset by the amounts owing to DHL
for shipping services provided to USS and its franchisees." (R. 159, 484). The USS
Parties further reminded the Mariposa Franchisees that they had not indicated whether
they disputed any of the amounts showing in the CAMS Data. (R. 159, 485).9

9

Throughout the fact section of their brief, the Mariposa Group claims that they
were repeatedly denied a copy of the DHL Agreement. {See, e.g., Aplts.' Brief at 7, 17).
The Mariposa Group misstates the record. Due to the confidentiality provision in the
DHL Agreement, the USS Parties repeatedly told the Mariposa Group to subpoena a copy
of that agreement, so that it could be released under the "legal process" exception to the
confidentiality provision in that agreement. (R. 159). During the hearing on the Motion,
that issue was again raised, and the district court encouraged the Mariposa Group to seek
the document through legal process. (R. 807 at 27:1-6, 28:9-10). Despite this, the
Mariposa Group declined to do so. It was not until the parties submitted the matter to
arbitration that the Mariposa Group finally served a document request seeking disclosure
of the document. In response, the USS Parties provided the Mariposa Group not only
with a copy of the agreement, but also with copies of email correspondence exchanged
with DHL leading up to that agreement.

Following this exchange, a number of the Mariposa Franchisees began complying
with their indemnification obligation under the Settlement Agreement and executed
promissory notes, as required under Paragraph 3 of the agreement (R. 159). However,
others continued to refuse to do so because they disputed any obligation to pay the USS
Parties the amounts reflected in the CAMS Data. (Id). Specifically, on March 17, 2011,
counsel for the Mariposa Franchisees sent a letter in which he stated that, unless the DHL
Agreement had been written in a specific manner advocated by the Mariposa Franchisees,
"there is no indemnification obligation." (R. 159-60, 487). He also stated that his clients
objected to the amounts reflected in the CAMS Data as "inaccurate." (R. 160, 488).
As a result of the continued refusal of certain Mariposa Franchisees to fulfill their
indemnification obligation and in a continued effort to resolve the dispute, the USS
Parties sent a third letter to the non-complying Mariposa Franchisees, attempting to
resolve the dispute regarding the indemnification obligation owed to the USS Parties and
to identify what amounts were disputed (the "June 1st Letters"). (R. 160, 490-528). In
the June 1st Letters, the USS Parties provided the specific amount owed by each
Mariposa Franchisee and again requested that each indicate whether that amount was
disputed. (R. 160, 490-528). If not, the USS Parties requested that they execute
Promissory Note # 2, as required by the Settlement Agreement. (R. 160, 490-528). If,
however, the Mariposa Franchisee disputed the amount, the letter requested that each
Mariposa Franchisee indicate the amount disputed, provide the basis for the dispute, and
include any relevant documentation. (R. 160, 490-528).
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In response, a few more of the Mariposa Franchisees fulfilled their
indemnification obligation by executing the required promissory note, but the remaining
group (the Mariposa Group) declined even to respond. (R. 161). As a result, on July 13,
2011, the USS Parties served the Mariposa Group with "Dispute Notices," which, under
Paragraphs l.c and 3 of the Settlement Agreement initiated the expedited arbitration
proceedings set forth in Paragraph 1 .c to resolve the dispute concerning the amount
owing to the USS Parties under the indemnification provision. (R. 161, 530-559). In
anticipation of these Dispute Notices, and to avoid or delay the expedited arbitration
process, on July 12, 2011, the Mariposa Group filed the Complaint in Third District
Court. (R. 1, 161). Ten days later, the Mariposa Group sent a letter to the USS Parties'
counsel, stating that they would not engage in arbitration or participate in the selection of
an arbitrator as required by the Settlement Agreement. (R. 161, 561).
In their Complaint, the Mariposa Group sought declaratory relief on four causes of
action and an injunction through a fifth cause of action. See (R. 11-17, 161; Complaint at
11-17). Throughout the Complaint, the Mariposa Group disputes the amounts owed, the
accuracy of the information provided, and ultimately, their indemnification obligation
itself (R. 11-17).
6.

The USS Parties Move to Compel Arbitration of the Parties' Dispute, and
the District Court Grants the Motion.

As a result of the Mariposa Group's refusal to participate in the arbitration process
provided for in the Settlement Agreement and their filing of the Complaint, on August 1,

2011, the USS Parties moved to compel arbitration of the parties' dispute. (R. 136).
The Mariposa Group filed an opposition to the Motion, and the district court heard oral
argument on the Motion on August 19,2011. (See R. 807.) At the end of the hearing, the
district court determined that, as a matter of law, the terms of the Settlement Agreement
required the parties to resolve their disputes in accordance with the arbitration procedure
contained in Paragraph I.e. (R. 807 at 28:7-20). On September 6, 2011, the district court
entered the Order, which provides: "The Motion is granted. The parties are ordered to
arbitrate their dispute in accordance with the arbitration procedures set forth in Paragraph
I.e. of the Settlement Agreement." (R. 703-04).
V.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This appeal is the latest in a series of attempts by the Mariposa Group since 2008
to avoid or delay their payment obligations to the USS Parties. The facts are not in
dispute. The parties entered into the Settlement Agreement, which contains an arbitration
provision. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Settlement Agreement require the parties to
arbitrate "any disputes" they have concerning any amounts owing to the USS Parties for
unpaid shipments. The only question at issue is whether the district court correctly
concluded that the parties' dispute falls within the arbitration provision of the agreement.
The answer is clearly, yes.
10

Contrary to Appellants5 claim, the USS Parties moved to compel arbitration of
the parties' disputes concerning any amounts owing under the indemnification provision
generally. The Motion was not limited to compelling arbitration of the disputes raised in
the Complaint as characterized by the Mariposa Group.

71369071.4 0063437-00013

17

The unambiguous language of the Settlement Agreement demonstrates that, at the
time of execution, there were only two issues the parties left to be resolved in the future
under specified procedures: (1) the amounts owing for unpaid freight shipments under
Paragraph 1 of the Settlement Agreement, and (2) the amount, if any, owing for DHL
shipments under Paragraph 3 of the Settlement Agreement. The language of both
paragraphs requires any dispute regarding those amounts to be resolved pursuant to the
expedited arbitration procedures of Paragraph 1 .c, and not through costly and extended
litigation (of the type they had just settled).
The Mariposa Group attempts to avoid this conclusion by advocating for a narrow,
hypertechnical, and convoluted interpretation of Paragraph 3—one that would limit the
arbitration only to certain categories, and even then, only to the issue of checking the
"accuracy" of the shipping data. The plain language of the Settlement Agreement is not
so limited. The agreement does not make arbitration conditional; it makes it mandatory.
Moreover, the word "accuracy" (on which the Mariposa Group pins its argument) does
not even appear in the Settlement Agreement.
Finally, it is clear that the dispute between the parties plainly concerns any
amounts owing under the indemnification provision and, hence, must be arbitrated. Try
as they might, the Mariposa Group cannot avoid the fact that the allegations of the
Complaint (no matter how cleverly written to tiy to avoid arbitration) boil down to
whether the Mariposa Group owes some amount to the USS Parties under the
indemnification provision. Indeed, from February 2011 to July 2011, the parties

exchanged numerous communications—all of which concerned whether the Mariposa
Group owed amounts to the USS Parties under the indemnification provision and, if so,
how much was owed. The Mariposa Group took the position that they did not owe
anything under that provision and, if they did, the amount indicated in the CAMS Data
was incorrect. Such positions plainly fall within the scope of "any dispute between the
USS Parties and the Mariposa Franchisees concerning these amounts." (Settlement
Agreement <[j 3.a). As such, pursuant to Paragraph 3.a, the dispute "shall be resolved in
accordance with the dispute resolution procedure set forth in Paragraph I.e." Id.
The district court saw through the Mariposa Group's attempt to avoid their
obligation to arbitrate the parties' dispute. The district court's decision should be
affirmed.
VI. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Correctly Enforced the Arbitration Provision and Construed
that Provision in Favor of Arbitration.
Because of Utah's strong policy favoring arbitration, Utah law has implemented a

clear and expedited procedure for resolving motions to compel arbitration. Section 78B11-108(1) of the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act (the "UAA") provides, "[o]n motion of a
person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another person's refusal to
arbitrate pursuant to the agreement... the court shall proceed summarily to decide the
issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable
agreement to arbitrate." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-108(1) (2008) (emphases added); see
also Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, \ 33, 44 P.3d 663 ("[I]f a party shows the
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existence of an arbitration agreement, then the court shall order the parties to arbitrate."
(internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted)).
In interpreting this section, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[wjhere the
evidence relating to a purported agreement to arbitrate is undisputed, the district court has
no discretion under the statute. It must compel arbitration." McCoy v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31,110, 20 P.3d 901. n Moreover, section 78B-1M08(4)
of the UAA makes clear that "[t]he court may not refuse to order arbitration" even where
"the claim subject to arbitration lacks merit or grounds for the claim have not been
established." Further, consistent with Utah's policy encouraging arbitration, courts are to
interpret the scope of arbitration provisions broadly and in favor of arbitration:
[I]f there is any question as to whether the parties agreed to resolve their
disputes through arbitration or litigation,... we interpret the agreement
keeping in mind our policy of encouraging arbitration. "It is the policy of
the law in Utah to interpret contracts in favor of arbitration, 'in keeping
with our policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution of disputes when the
parties have agreed not to litigate.'"
Cent. Fla., 2002 UT 3, ^f 16 (citations omitted; emphasis added).12
In this case, it is undisputed that the Settlement Agreement contains an agreement
to arbitrate. The Mariposa Group does not dispute that the arbitration provision is valid
11
12

Section 78B-11-108 was previously codified as Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-49.

See also Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah
1992) (stating "this court has also recognized the strong public policy in favor of
arbitration 'as an approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and
easing court congestion'" (footnote omitted)); Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Sys.,
Inc., 731 P.2d 475,479 (Utah 1986) ("It is our policy to interpret arbitration clauses in a
manner that favors arbitration.").

and binding. The only question presented by the Mariposa Group's appeal is whether the
district court correctly concluded that the dispute between the parties falls within the
scope of the arbitration provision. A plain reading of the Settlement Agreement confirms
that it did.
B.

The Settlement Agreement Requires the Parties to Arbitrate "Any Dispute"
Concerning Amounts Owed Under the Indemnification Provision.
The heart of the dispute between the parties is whether the Mariposa Group is

obligated to indemnify the USS Parties for the amounts the USS Parties had to pay to
DHL for unpaid DHL shipments and, if so, what amount they owe. Throughout 2011,
the Mariposa Group repeatedly took the position that they owed nothing under the
indemnification provision or, if they did, they did not owe the amount claimed by the
USS Parties. (R. 487-88, 561-62). The USS Parties disputed that position. The
unambiguous language of the Settlement Agreement shows that the parties agreed that
this dispute would be resolved through arbitration.
Whether a motion to compel arbitration was properly granted is, in the first
instance, "a matter of contract interpretation" to "determine whether the parties bargained
for arbitration as a method of resolving their disagreements.5' Cent. Fla., 2002 UT 3,
Tf 10. As such, the court looks to the "four corners of the agreement to determine the
intentions of the parties." Id. \ 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the
language is unambiguous, "the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning
of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Id.
In interpreting the arbitration agreement, the court "attempts] to harmonize all of the
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contract's provisions and all of its terms." Id. Moreover, as already noted, the court must
construe the contract in favor of arbitration. Id. f 16.13 Here, the terms of the Settlement
Agreement are unambiguous and show that the parties bargained to have disputes like the
one between the parties resolved exclusively through arbitration.
The language of the Settlement Agreement is not ambiguous. In the agreement,
the parties resolved all disputes between them, except for two issues they left to be
resolved at a future date: (1) the amount USS was owed for unpaid freight (to be
determined after the CAMS Data had been exchanged), and (2) the amount the USS
Parties were determined to owe to DHL for unpaid DHL shipments provided to the
Mariposa Franchisees or their customers, if any (regardless of whether that amount was
established through settlement or judgment), which was to be determined once the DHL
Lawsuit had been concluded. With respect to both of these issues, the parties made clear
that "any dispute" would be resolved exclusively through the binding arbitration
procedure of Paragraph I.e. {See Settlement Agreementffl[I.e. & 3.a). In particular, as it
relates to the indemnification provision of Paragraph 3, the agreement provides as
follows:
3.
Indemnification by the Mariposa Franchisees for DHL
Services. By entering into this Agreement, the respective Mariposa
Franchisees agree to indemnify and hold USS harmless for any and all
amounts the USS Parties are determined to owe DHL through judgment or
settlement for DHL services provided to the respective Mariposa
See also Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 479 ("It is our policy to interpret
arbitration clauses in a manner that favors arbitration.").

Franchisees and/or their customers and which the respective Mariposa
Franchisees or their customers have not already paid to USS or DHL
{regardless of whether that determination is by judgment or through
settlement, and regardless of whether the amount is determined through setoff amounts that may reduce any judgment in favor of the USS Parties and
against DHL)
(Settlement Agreement \ 3) (emphases added). The very next paragraph, Subparagraph
3.a (which specifically addresses the amount of the indemnification obligation set forth in
Paragraph 3), states that, if "any dispute" arises between the parties concerning any
amounts at issue, that dispute is a matter for arbitration:
a.
The Parties agree that, if DHL and the USS Parties desire to
resolve the DHL Lawsuit through a settlement, the USS Parties shall
provide the Mariposa Franchisees with access to the CAMS Data (of the
same type and nature set forth in Paragraph 1 above) necessary to show the
DHL Services provided to the Mariposa Franchisees and/or their customers.
If the Mariposa Franchisees do not agree with the amount identified by the
USS Parties, the USS Parties shall nevertheless have the right to proceed
with the settlement and any dispute between the USS Parties and the
Mariposa Franchisees concerning these amounts shall be resolved in
accordance with the dispute resolution procedure [(arbitration)] set forth
in Paragraph he. above. Likewise, if the USS Parties are determined to
owe DHL, through a judgment, any amount for services provided to the
Mariposa Franchisees and/or their customers, any dispute between the USS
Parties and the Mariposa Franchisees concerning such amounts shall be
resolvefdj in accordance with the dispute resolution procedure
[(arbitration)] set forth in Paragraph he above. .. }
Paragraph l.c of the Settlement Agreement provides, in part:
Dispute Resolution Procedure. The Parties agree that any dispute
regarding the [indemnification obligation] will be fully and finally resolved
exclusively by binding arbitration, as set forth in this provision.
i.
If USS and any Mariposa Franchisee are unable to resolve
any dispute regarding the amount owed by a Mariposa Franchisee . . .
within ten (10) days after USS has delivered the Dispute Notice to such
(continued . . .)
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Id. f 3.a (emphases added).
Interpreting paragraphs 3, 3.a and I.e. together plainly shows that the parties
wanted to avoid further extended litigation and intended to arbitrate, on an expected
basis, "any dispute" concerning the amounts the USS Parties claimed to be owed under
the indemnification provision, regardless of whether that dispute arose out of a settlement
between the USS Parties and DHL or a judgment in the DHL Lawsuit. The use of the
words "any dispute," denotes that the parties intended all disputes regarding the
amounts—whether the dispute centered on a discrepancy in the numbers or in the basic
question of whether Mariposa Franchisees owed anything at all—to be resolved by
arbitration. (R. 807 at 26:12-18).
C.

The Mariposa Group's Narrow, Hypertechnical Interpretation Is not
Consistent with the Settlement Agreement and Is Unreasonable.
In their attempt to escape arbitration, the Mariposa Group advocates a narrow,

hypertechnical, and unreasonable interpretation of Paragraph 3.a of the Settlement
Agreement. To do so, they manufacture imaginary limitations and conditions that are not
present in the agreement. Their interpretation does not comport with Utah law, does not

(... continued)
franchisee, the parties shall submit the matter to binding arbitration before
one forensic accountant, who shall review the parties' documentation and
establish the amount owed to USS, if any, on any disputed invoices.
Settlement Agreement \ l.c (emphases added).

follow the requirement that arbitration provisions should be construed broadly in favor of
arbitration, and should be rejected.
The Mariposa Group argues that the Settlement Agreement provides only three
limited categories of disputes that the parties intended to be subject to arbitration. The
first category they argue derives from Paragraphs l.a & b of the Settlement Agreement
and pertains only to freight disputes. (See Aplts.' Brief at 11-12). The second category
of disputes they claim are subject to arbitration arises out of the last sentence of
Paragraph 3.a, and, according to them, pertains only where a dispute arises after a
judgment has been entered in the DHL Lawsuit. (Id. at 14-15). As no final judgment
was entered in that case, the Mariposa Group claims this category is inapplicable. (Id.)
Finally, the Mariposa Group asserts that the third category of arbitrable disputes comes
out of Paragraph 3.a, but claims such disputes are only arbitrable if the USS Parties want
to settle with DHL and if the USS Parties satisfy "certain specific" preconditions. (See
id. at 14-15).15 If the USS Parties failed to satisfy any of those conditions, they claim the
USS Parties "forfeited] any right to arbitration." (Id. at 14). The Mariposa Group claims
that, because the USS Parties did not satisfy each of these conditions precedent prior to
settling with DHL, the USS Parties lost their right to submit the dispute to arbitration.
15

Specifically, the Mariposa Group identifies these "certain specific" conditions to
consist of the following four steps: (1) "USS must desire to resolve the DHL Lawsuit
through settlement"; (2) "USS must provide the Mariposa Franchisees with CAMS Data
before entering into a settlement with DHL"; (3) "the Mariposa Franchisees must
disagree with the amounts identified by USS through the CAMS Data"; (4) "USS must
proceed with settlement." (Aplts.' Brief at 13).
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{Id.) The Mariposa Group's interpretation finds no support in the Settlement Agreement,
ignores the obvious breadth of the words "any disputes/' and is unreasonable.
As already noted, Paragraph 3.a provides that "any dispute" concerning the
amounts identified by the USS Parties must be resolved through arbitration. This
language, particularly when read in light of Utah law that requires arbitration provisions
to be construed broadly and in favor of arbitration, see Cent Fla., 2002 UT 3, f 16,
denotes that all disputes relating in any way to any amounts alleged to be owing fall
within the arbitration requirement.16 Not only would the Mariposa Group's interpretation
require a court to sidestep the words "any dispute" and applicable Utah law, the
preconditions they seek to impose are unsupported by the language of the agreement.
Paragraph 3.a does not state that, if the USS Parties do not inform the Mariposa Group of
the settlement or provide the CAMS Data before a settlement, they forfeit their right to

16

The Mariposa Group cites to Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, ^26, 189 P.3d 40,
and Ellsworth v. American Arbitration Ass % 2006 UT 77, ^ 14, 148 P.3d 983, for the
proposition that the "'presumption in favor of arbitration . . . applies only when
arbitration is a bargained-for remedy of the parties as evidenced by direct and specific
evidence of a contract to arbitrate.'" (Aplts.' Brief at 10 (quoting Bybee, 2008 UT App %
26) Their reliance on these cases is misplaced. Those cases addressed whether there was
any agreement to arbitrate in the first instance given the lack of direct and specific
evidence. See Bybee, 2008 UT 35, f 34 (holding arbitration agreement cannot bind a
nonsignatory spouse bringing a wrongful death claim); Ellsworth, 2006 UT 77, ^f 18
(holding that arbitration agreement with a person's name but no signature is not direct
and specific evidence of an agreement to arbitrate). In contrast, in this case, there is no
dispute that an agreement to arbitrate exists. Hence, the presumption in favor of
arbitration unquestionably applies.

arbitration.

Indeed, there is no mention anywhere in the agreement that the arbitration

requirement is ever to be disregarded. Moreover, Paragraphs 1 and 3 do not contain any
language that would indicate that disputes are to be resolved in a manner other than
through arbitration.
Adding to the problems with the Mariposa Group's interpretation is the fact that
their alleged preconditions to arbitrability do not move this dispute away from arbitration.
Rather, they require it. After all, the UAA provides that, while a court may decide
"whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to
arbitrate":
An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability
has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid agreement to
arbitrate is enforceable.

The Mariposa Group has lost any right to argue that the USS Parties waived or
forfeited the right to arbitrate as they did not raise that issue with the district court and did
not preserve it for appeal. See In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ^f 25, 266 P.3d
702; see also Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, f 38, 176 P.3d 464 ("Because
[appellant] raises his waiver argument for the first time on appeal, and has failed to cite
where in the record his argument is preserved, we refuse to address the merits of this
claim.5').
The Mariposa Group claims the parties must have intended to narrowly limit
arbitration to the categories they advocate because Paragraph 5 of the Settlement
Agreement states that, in the event of a default by a Mariposa Franchisee, the USS Parties
"may commence an action against him, her or it in Third Judicial District of Utah, file the
Verified Confession of Judgment, and recover for any amount still owing to the USS
Parties
" (Aplts.' Brief at 15). This argument ignores the purpose of Paragraph 5.
That paragraph addresses only the USS Parties' right to enforce the security provided by
the Mariposa Franchisees—i.e., the verified confessions of judgment—by filing those
confessions ofjudgment with the court to obtain a judgment by confession. Only a court
can enter a judgment by confession.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-107(2) & (3) (emphases added). By arguing that Paragraph
3.a imposes conditions precedent to arbitrability, the Mariposa Group renders this dispute
all the more a dispute for an arbitrator, not a court.
Similarly, there is no merit to the Mariposa Group's contention that the only
disputes that are arbitrable under Paragraph 3.a are those that relate to the "accuracy" of
the amounts identified in the CAMS Data. (See Aplts.' Brief at 16). Notably, this
argument, by its very nature, is flawed because it would require the court to read into the
contract a term that is not there. The word "accuracy" does not appear in Paragraph 3.a
or, for that matter, any paragraph of the Settlement Agreement Rather, the language
provides that, if there is "any dispute . . . concerning [indemnification] amounts," it "shall
be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution procedure set forth in Paragraph
I.e. above." (Settlement Agreement^ 3.a).
Finally, the Mariposa Group's interpretation should be rejected because it is
unreasonable and would result in nonsensical outcomes. See Olympus Hills Shopping
Ctr., Ltd v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 458 n.16 ("[Cjourts should
avoid [an] unreasonable interpretation when [a] contract provision would be reduced to
absurdity . . . . " ) ; McNeil Eng'g & Land Surveying, LLC v. Bennett, 2011 UT App 423, t
17, 268 P.3d 854 ("'[A]n interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective
meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part
unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect.'" (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
203(a) (1981))).

For example, under the Mariposa Group's interpretation of Paragraph 3.a, if the
USS Parties had provided the CAMS Data prior to the settlement, any disputes regarding
the amounts owing would have to be resolved through arbitration. If, however, the USS
Parties provided the CAMS Data after settling with DHL, the parties would be required
to resolve their dispute through court proceedings, even though the dispute may be about
the very same issue and even though the USS Parties retained the unfettered right under
Paragraph 3.a to settle the case with DHL irrespective of the Mariposa Franchisees'
reaction to the settlement. The Mariposa Group offers no explanation for why the parties
would have intended such an irrational result.
Moreover, if the Mariposa Group's interpretation were correct, the three categories
of disputes they identify would have to be arbitrated, but all other disputes would have to
be resolved in different tribunals, even if those disputes were all related to or arose out of
the same set of circumstances as the matters being arbitrated. This would inevitably
result in the need to resolve disputes piecemeal with the potential for overlapping and
inconsistent rulings. The very same result would occur if only disputes regarding the
"accuracy" of the CAMS Data were arbitrable. Using this case as an example, under the
«

Mariposa Group's theory, the parties would first have to take their case to court to resolve
all disputes other than the accuracy of the CAMS Data. Then, if the USS Parties
prevailed in establishing a right to be indemnified, the USS Parties would have to file a
separate arbitration to resolve the disputes regarding the accuracy of the CAMS Data.

Again, there is no indication that the parties intended such a result, and such an outcome
is clearly not consistent with the parties' intent to arbitrate disputes and avoid litigation.
Simply put, by using the words "any dispute," the parties intended all disputes
concerning any amount owing under Paragraph 3 to be arbitrated. The Mariposa Group's
interpretation is not consistent with the terms of the agreement, is contrary to Utah law,
and is unreasonable.
D.

The Parties Dispute Falls Within the Scope of "Any Disputes" Under
Paragraph 3 of the Settlement Agreement.
In a final effort to avoid arbitration, the Mariposa Group argues that the district

court erred in granting the Motion because the "causes of action alleged in the
Complaint" fall outside of the intended scope of the arbitration provision. (Aplts.' Brief
at 17-18). This argument, like the Mariposa Group's other arguments, too narrowly
construes the nature of the parties' dispute and inaccurately portrays the Complaint. The
parties' dispute, including the claims in the Complaint, all center on the question of the
amount, if any, that the Mariposa Group owes the USS Parties under Paragraph 3. As
such, the dispute is subject to the arbitration provision.
As an initial matter, the Mariposa Group's argument regarding the nature of the
parties' dispute is flawed because it is based on the assumption that the parties' dispute is
defined only by the contents of the Mariposa Group's Complaint. That assumption is
incorrect. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-108 (the provision governing motions to compel
arbitration) allows a party to compel arbitration of any issue that is subject to arbitration,
not only issues that were improperly filed in court through a complaint.

In this case, and after nearly six months of the Mariposa Group challenging that
they owed the amounts identified by the USS Parties and refusing to sign promissory
notes in those amounts, the USS Parties sent out "Dispute Notices" triggering an
arbitration to resolve the dispute. (R. 161, 530-559). It was only in July 2011, and after
that dispute had ripened, that the Mariposa Group filed the Complaint. (R. 1). Even
then, the Complaint was an obvious effort by the Mariposa Group to avoid the arbitration
by attempting to re-characterize the nature of the parties9 dispute. The district court saw
through the Mariposa Group's effort, concluded that the parties' dispute fell within the
scope of the arbitration provision, and ordered the parties to resolve their dispute through
arbitration. (R. 807 at 28:7-20). In doing so, the district court did not base its ruling only
on the content of the Complaint. (R. 703-04; 807 at 11:16-19).
Even setting aside the parties' larger dispute, the Mariposa Group's contention that
the claims in the Complaint do not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision
misrepresents the Complaint. As set forth above, Paragraph 3.a makes clear that,
pursuant to Paragraph l.c, the arbitrator shall hear "any dispute between the USS Parties
and the Mariposa Franchisees concerning [the] amounts [identified by the USS
Parties]...." Settlement Agreement ^f 3.a (emphasis added); see also id ^ l.c ("The
Parties agree that any dispute ... will be fully and finally resolved exclusively by
binding arbitration, as set forth in this provision") (emphasis added). Certainly then, "any
dispute" would include a dispute concerning the accuracy of the CAMS Data, but also
any claim by the Mariposa Group that they cannot tell what they owe or a claim that they
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only owe a certain percentage of what is being sought or that they owe nothing at all.
Each of the claims in the Complaint are subsumed within these issues and are a subset of
the larger question of the amount, if any, owed to the USS Parties under Paragraph 3 of
the Settlement Agreement.
For example, the Mariposa Group's First cause of action contains the following
statement: "Accordingly, the dispute over the amounts owed under Paragraph 3 of the
Settlement Agreement has sharpened into an imminent clash of legal rights and
obligations between Plaintiffs and USS." (R. 12; Compl. ^f 82) (emphasis added).
Likewise, their second cause of action states, "Plaintiffs have clearly informed USS that
they have not received sufficient information to determine the amounts they owe and that
they • . . dispute the amounts contained in the CAMS database." (R. 13; Compl. ^f 89
(emphasis added).
Similarly, in their third cause of action, the Mariposa Group disputes the amounts
the USS Parties allege to be owing because they claim that "the CAMS database had not
been updated to reflect the actual amount of the alleged offset," (R. 14, Compl. ^f 96; "the
CAMS database contains errors," (R. 14; Compl. ^ 99); and USS failed to provide
Plaintiffs with any determination of the amounts owed to DHL for the Mariposa
Franchisees unpaid shipments. (R. 14; Compl. f 97).19 Finally, in their fourth cause of

In addition, Paragraph 60 of the Complaint alleges that the Mariposa Group
disputes the amounts reflected in the CAMS Data provided by the USS Parties: "When
Plaintiffs accessed the CAMS database, they realized that it contained errors with respect
(continued...)

action, the Mariposa Group seeks a declaration that they "are not in default of the
Settlement Agreement" by failing to sign the promissory note in the amounts identified
by the USS Parties. (R. 16; Compl. *§ 114). All of these matters center on what is owed,
if anything, to the USS Parties under Paragraph 3 and are, therefore, subject to mandatory
arbitration.
The Mariposa Group fails to show how these claims fall outside of the arbitration
provision. While they feign that their claims were to obtain the DHL Agreement and, as
such, were not about the amount they owe, that contention is disingenuous. (See Aplts.'
Brief at 17-18.) Prior to filing of the Complaint and then at oral argument, counsel for
the USS Parties (and the district court also) suggested to the Mariposa Group's counsel
that he subpoena the document. (See R. 807 at 26:20 to 27:6, 28:9-10). For whatever
reason, he chose not to do so. When the parties proceeded to arbitration, the Mariposa
Group received the DHL Settlement Agreement and related documents in response to a
discovery request.

Moreover, as the district court recognized, any claims related to

obtaining the DHL Agreement were part and parcel of the larger question of what is
owed under Paragraph 3 of the agreement and could be addressed by the arbitrator. (R.
807 at 24:16-17, 27:7-12, 28:3-13).
(... continued)
to royalties due to USS and adjustments credited to Plaintiffs for 'Problem Shipments
...." (R. 9; Compl. at 9).
Given this, were this case remanded to the district court, any claims related to
obtaining the DHL Agreement would be moot.
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Finally, the nature of the Mariposa Group's claim cannot be determined only by
looking at the way the Mariposa Group pled their claims or by their own allegations. If
this were not the case, a party could merely avoid arbitration by creatively pleading
claims so that they would appear to be beyond the scope of the arbitration provision.
Claims should be assessed as they really are. The Utah Supreme Court confirmed as
much in the Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates case.
In that case, the parties had agreed to an arbitration provision that required that
"[a]ny disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated .. .." 2002 UT
3, % 4. After the plaintiff had filed claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and specific performance, it attempted to avoid arbitration
by claiming that the dispute did not fall within the arbitration provision "because it [was]
a dispute over the enforcement of the agreement, as opposed to a dispute over the terms
of the agreement." Id. \ 17. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. In doing so, it
stated:
In this instance, to distinguish between the terms themselves and
enforcement of the terms would be meaningless—a distinction without a
difference.
To interpret the agreement in this way would, in effect, nullify the
agreement to arbitrate. Put otherwise, an agreement to arbitrate only terms
of an agreement is of no effect if the parties can simply bring suit to enforce
their interpretation of the terms of the agreement.... The language of the
addendum indicates an intent to arbitrate. If the exception advocated by
[the plaintiff]... were permitted, it would swallow the bargain that "any
disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated."
Moreover, [the plaintiffs] proposed interpretation would be contrary to the
parties' intent, apparent from the four corners of the agreement, to avoid
litigation and resolve any disputes through arbitration.

Id 1fll 17-18 (footnote omitted).
The same is true here. The Mariposa Group attempts to interpret the Settlement
Agreement and their Complaint in such a way as to nullify the agreement to arbitrate.
Despite the parties' clear intent, as expressed in the four corners of the document, that
"any dispute" concerning the amounts owing under Paragraph 3 would be resolved
through arbitration, the Mariposa Group advocates an interpretation that so narrowly
construes that provision as to render it of no effect and to "swallow the bargain." Id. f
18. The district court agreed. It found the Mariposa Group's arguments unconvincing.
In reading the arbitration provisions of the Settlement Agreement, the district court held
that the language is "broad enough" and requires the parties "to engage in arbitration" to
resolve the disputes between the parties. (R. 807 at 28:7-9,11-13,18-20). The USS
Parties respectfully request this Court do likewise and affirm the district court's decision
ordering the parties to engage in mandatory arbitration.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's Order
granting the Motion to Compel Arbitration.
DATED this 2nd day of April 2012.

David J. Jordan
Cameron L. Sabin
Joseph W. Loosle
Attorneys for Appellees
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Validity of agreement to arbitrate.
78B-11-107. Validity of agreement to arbitrate.
(1) An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising
between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law
or in equity for the revocation of a contract.
(2) The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement
to arbitrate.
(3) An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a
contract containing a valid agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.
(4) If a party to a judicial proceeding challenges the existence of, or claims that a controversy is not subject to,
an agreement to arbitrate, the arbitration proceeding may continue pendingfinalresolution of the issue by the
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Motion to compel arbitration.
78B-11-108. Motion to compel arbitration.
(1) On motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another person's refusal to arbitrate
pursuant to the agreement:
(a) if the refusing party does not appear or does not oppose the motion, the court shall order the parties to
arbitrate; and
(b) if the refusing party opposes the motion, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue and order
the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.
(2) On motion of a person alleging that an arbitration proceeding has been initiated or threatened but that there
is no agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue. If the court finds that there is
an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, it shall order the parties to arbitrate.
(3) If the court finds that there is no enforceable agreement, it may not, pursuant to Subsection (1) or (2), order
the parties to arbitrate.
(4) The court may not refuse to order arbitration because the claim subject to arbitration lacks merit or grounds
for the claim have not been established.
(5) If a proceeding involving a claim referable to arbitration under an alleged agreement to arbitrate is pending
in court, a motion under this section must be made in that court. Otherwise a motion under this section may be
made in any court as provided in Section 78B-11-128.
(6) If a party makes a motion to the court to order arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial
proceeding that involves a claim alleged to be subject to the arbitration until the court renders a final decision
under this section.
(7) If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a
claim subject to the arbitration. If a claim subject to the arbitration is severable, the court may limit the stay to
that claim.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3,2008 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78B11_Q10800.ZIP 2,432 Bytes
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY

n
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

-0O0-

MARIPOSA EXPRESS, INC.,

)

COLD SPRING INVESTMENTS,

)

L L C , COLD SPRING

)

INVESTMENTS NO. 1, COLD

)

SPRING INVESTMENTS NO. 2,

)

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

NEWBURYPORT CAPITAL, LLC,

)

COMPEL MANDATORY ARBITRATION

HANNAH ENTERPRISES, INC.,

)

AND TO DISMISS OR,

USS HOLDINGS, LLC,

)

ALTERNATIVELY, STAY

USS COLUMBIA LLC, METRO MAR )

PROCEEDINGS PENDING

VENTURES, LLC, MICHAEL

)

JONES, LLC, STIRLING, LLC,

)

MICHAELSON VENTURES, INC.,

)

USS OBRIEN, INC., USS

)

HIGHLAND PARK, INC.,

)

SHARON McWILLIAMS, GEORGE

)

AMMIRATO, WILLIAM DEMET,

)

ROBERT HARRIS, MICHAEL

)

JONES, TED MICHAELSON, JIM

)

OBRIEN, STEFAN

)
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TRIANDAFILOU,

2
3
4
5

Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNITED SHIPPING SOLUTIONS,
LLC, USS LOGISTICS, LLC,
ROBERT ROSS, CHARLES DERR
and JESSE MOORE,

6
Defendants.
7
-oOo8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 19th day of August,
2011, commencing at the hour of 1:38 p.m., the above-entitled
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE WILLIAM W.
BARRETT, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the
purpose of this cause, and that the following proceedings were
had.
-oOoA P P E A R A N C E S
KARTHIK NADESAN
For the Plaintiffs:
Attorney at Law
Nadesan Beck
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
DAVID J. JORDAN
For the Defendants
JOSEPH W. LOOSLE
Attorneys at Law
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3 .

(Transcriber's Note:

4

Speaker identification

a

5

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

6
7

THE COURT:

8

Okay.

9

Be right with you.

This is Mariposa Express, Inc. and others vs.

United Shipping Solutions, LLC and others.

10

May I have appearances, please?

11

MR. NADESAN:

12

plaintiffs, Mari--we f ll just call them the Mariposa group.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. JORDAN:

15

Karthik Nadesan on behalf of the

Okay.
David Jordan and Joe Loosle of Stoel

Rives on behalf of USS.

16

THE COURT:

It's your motion.

17

MR. NADESAN:

18

MR. JORDAN:

19

MR. NADESAN:

20

THE COURT:

21

Mr. Jordan, are you going to argue this?

22

MR. JORDAN:

23

A little procedural history may be helpful to the

Actually, your Honor, i t f s —
My motion.
— t h e i r motion.
Your motion.

24

Court here.

25

predecessor litigation.

I am.

That f s right.

I f m sorry,

Thank you, your Honor.

This case arises out of to different pieces of

•^TS^SSST™
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shipping services through a DHL and they conducted their

2

business through a franchise system.

3

franchisees who had territories throughout the United. States

4

and within their territories, they had the authority to re-

5

sell at wholesale rates the shipping services of DHL.

6

USS contracted with

There came a time in 2008 when DHL decided that it

7

was going to get out of the domestic shipping business in the

8

United States.

9

obligations to USS and its franchise organization.

In doing so, they breached their contractual
That

10

spawned litigation in which USS was the plaintiff suing for

11

breach of contract and other claims based on DHL's unilateral

12

decision to exit the market.

13

At the same time, when DHL pulle^d out of the

14

domestic market, certain franchisees of USS made the

15

unilateral decision to stop paying their bills, although they

16

continued to sell and use DHL shipping services for a period

17

of time.

18

clients were selling DHL services and--and DHL was shipping

19

for those franchisees, for their customers and those

20

franchisees were not paying for those shipping services.

21

That resulted in litigation between USS and certain of its

22

franchisees.

23

So there was a window within which the plaintiffs 1

Those two cases give rise to this litigation in the

24

following way:

In the USS franchisees litigation, which was

25

before Judge Toomey, a TRO was entered against the franchisees P
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which the franchisees violated, Judge Toomey entered an order

2

to show cause why they shouldn't be held in contempt.

3

that order to show cause was fully heard and sanctions were

4

granted on the contempt ruling, USS and its franchisees

5

entered into a settlement agreement.

6

agreement has the arbitration clause, which is the subject of

7

today's motion.

8
9

^

Before

That settlement

That arbitration clause is part of a larger
agreement which provides in part that if DHL and the USS

10

parties desire to resolve the DHL lawsuit through a

11

settlement, the USS parties shall provide the Mariposa

12

franchisees with access to the CAMS data, that f s just the

13

financial data showing all the shipments that all the

14

franchisees made and all the invoices that they rendered.

15

the Mariposa franchisees do not agree with the amount

16

identified by the USS parties, the USS parties shall have the

17

right to proceed with the settlement and any dispute between

18

the USS parties and the Mariposa franchisees concerning these

19

amounts shall be resolved in accordance with the dispute

20

resolution procedure set forth in Paragraph 1(C) above.

21

Paragraph 1(C) above is a comprehensive arbitration clause

22

that say any dispute between the parties has to be submitted

23

to a single arbitrator or arbitration within certain time

24

limits•

25

There's another important section of this same
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paragraph and it says, likewise, if the USS parties are

2

determined to owe DHL through a judgment any amount for

3

services provided to the Mariposa franchisees or their

4

customers, any dispute between the USS parties and the

5

Mariposa franchisees concerning such amounts shall be resolved

6

in accordance with the dispute resolution paragraph set forth

7

in Paragraph 1(C) above.

8

the general alternative dispute resolution arbitration clause

9

in the agreement.

10

Both referring back to 1(C) which is

Well, a little bit more history,.

After the Mariposa

11

franchisees and USS had entered into the settlement agreement

12

containing this dispute resolution language, DHL and USS

13

proceeded down the road with the litigation in their case,

14

which was--which was then pending.

15

What ultimately happened in that case is a little

16

bit of judgment and a little bit of settlement.

17

summary judgment motion filed by DHL on its counterclaim and

18

DHL ! s counterclaim said, your franchisees have continued to

19

ship and they have incurred charges for which they haven't

20

paid and you owe us for all of those shipments that we've

21

made—DHL speaking—and for which we haven f t been paid.

22

There was a

Judge Maughan heard that case and Judge Maughan

23

entered a memorandum decision granting summary judgment in

24

DHL's favor.

25

order in that regard.

I'll just read to the Court the language in his
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1

to pay for all the charges, creates liability as a matter of

|

2

law in an amount to be determined at trial.

1

3

entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability under

1

4

its--under its breach of contract counterclaim.

1

5

claiming various defenses to their counterclaim, Judge Barrett |

6

ruled against us, we represented USS in that DHL case as well

I

7

and summary judgment was ordered against us saying,

1

8

effectively, whatever charges you've incurred for shipments

I

9

that you've used and haven't paid for, you owe it.

1

Liability-THE COURT:

1
1

10
11

MR. JORDAN:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. JORDAN:

THE COURT:

17

MR. JORDAN:

18

THE COURT:

20
21

This is to the Mariposa—

It f s all the franchisees, including-- fe
All the franchisees.

Okay.

1

--the—the Mariposa franchisees.

1

They're a sub-set of the large--

16

19

So we were

11

12

15

DHL is therefore

1

So—

1

— g r o u p of franchisees.
Okay.

1

So that—but no dollar amount?

You 1 re going to go to trial.
MR. JORDAN:

1
1

No dollar amount was affixed, would--

that would be determined at trial.

.1
8

22

After that summary judgment was entered against us, 1

23

it took one of the issues out of the case, obviously, and our 1

24

claims against them then were resolved by settlement.

25

obviously, in that settlement negotiation, the parties had to, 1
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1
2

in fact, offset what we'd already been adjudged to owe.
*

There wasn't a serious dispute between USS and DHL

1
1

3

about what we owe them, a little bit of accounting

1

4

disagreements, but we essentially knew what we'd shipped and

1

5

hadn't paid for and so that obviously was part of the

1

6

settlement discussion 'cause judgment had already been entered I

7

against us that we were going to wind up owing amounts that we 1

8

obviously couldn't dispute.

9

1

After the settlement, we notified the Mariposa

1

10

franchisees and the other franchisees that we had settled and

1

11

that we had had to set off the amounts that we actually owed

1

12

because they actually shipped and incurred expenses for which

1

13

they actually hadn't paid.

1

14

agreement, that was supposed to trigger a process by which

1

15

they would then examine our financial data, which we call the

1

16

CAMS data, all the invoice information, and see if they

1

17
18

disagreed with us about what their individual piece of that
was. Our discussions with DHL level were at a macro level

19

about total amounts owed as opposed to what is--what is any

And under the settlement

I

P
L
|J

I1
20
21

single franchisee's piece of the whole thing.
jl
So we provided them with CAMS data, we said, this is !

22
23
24

what we think you owe use, do you dispute it in any way and if t
N
you do, then let's have the arbitration that's called for and- :
-and then things would roll out from the arbitration with an

25

amount determined specific to each franchisee, 'cause they

I

r

I
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each have their own franchise, they each have their own

2

business.

3

Instead of going through arbitration with us and

4

specifically disputing the amount that we said, this is our

5

calculation of what you individually owe us, they filed this

6

lawsuit.

7

just say in a very general way, I think they would like to

8

delay the date of reckoning on what they owe us until after

9

they have fully litigated their own third case against DHL,

And I could speculate as to the motives, but let me

10

There is pending in the State of New York a Mariposa

11

franchisee case against DHL in which they claim damages for

12

DHL having pulled out of the market in violation of their

13

contractual obligations.

14

money from DHL before they have to pay money out to our

15

clients.

16

I think they'd like to get their

And hence, this particular case and I think the

17

Court will see in their briefing efforts to hyper-technically

18

construe the arbitration clause in such a way as to say that

19

this particular dispute, which they say they're trying to

20

raise is somehow outside the scope of the arbitration

21

agreement.

22

So, that's the history that brings us here today.
Just a little piece of law now that I think is

23

helpful.

In the Central Florida Investors case, which was

24

decided by our Supreme Court in 2002, the court said this:

25

is the policy of the law in Utah to interpret contracts in
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favor of arbitration in keeping with our policy of encouraging

2

extra-judicial resolution of disputes when the parties have

3

agreed not to litigate.

4

So-, I think that sets up a presumption and the

5

thought that if it sort of seems murky at all, we resolve

6

those kinds of concerns in favor of arbitration.

7

policy of the State as announced by the Supreme Court.

8
9

That's the

What I think is critical here is the language that I
was quoting to the Court which says:

I'll take it from the

10

second part here.

11

through a judgment, any amount for services provided to the

12

Mariposa franchisees and/or their customers, any dispute

13

between the USS parties and the Mariposa franchisees

14

concerning such amounts shall be resolved in accordance with

15

the dispute resolution procedure, the arbitration clause,

16

single arbitrating within certain specified time limits.

17

If the parties are determine to owe DHL,

So whether you're resolving it by settlement, which

18

is the first part of the Paragraph 3(A) of the clause or

19

whether you're resolving it by judgment, which is th€i second

20

part and in this case, it's both.

21

liability and then ultimately, settlement as to a macro amount

22

was--was made in the case as to what would be owing under the

23

Court's summary judgment.

24

Paragraph 1(C) and in both cases, the same language is used,

25

which is any dispute, any dispute.
''i™# ii*Us>g&*mln<r*>i.
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1

Given the State's policy in favor of arbitration and

2

construing doubts in favor of arbitration and presuming that

3

arbitration should be the appropriate remedy where the parties

4

have agreed to--agreed to arbitration, I think this is a very

5

straightforward case,

6

Now they--they want to raise what I consider to be

7

hyper-technical issues about whether we should have given them

8

data before we settled or whether they should have gotten the

9

data after we settled or whether or not that's important.

10

What is true is that they have all the data, all the financial

11

data, they have our calculation of what we consider that they

12

owe, individually, by plaintiff, and now is the time for each

13

individual franchisee to step up and say, I think it's less

14

than that, that's to be determined by arbitration and not by

15

this Court.

16

If I can answer any questions, I'd be happy to.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. JORDAN:

19

THE COURT:

20

And it's Nadesan?

21

MR. NADESAN:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. NADESAN:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. NADESAN:

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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1
2

THE COURT:

I've g o t — I ' m sorry.

Run that by me one

more time.

3

MR. NADESAN:

N-a-d-e-s-a-n.

4

THE COURT:

5

Mr* Nadesan,

Sorry.

6

MR. NADESAN:

Your Honor, this matter stems from

N-a-d-e-s-a-n.

Nadesan.

Okay.

7

something that rather troublesome about the settlement between

8

DHL and USS.

9

represented as being confidential; however, at the same time,

10

even in open court here today, they represent to you what the

11

contents of that settlement agreement is.

12

say under the settlement agreement, we had to pay DHL a

13

certain amount.

14

Specifically, that settlement agreement USS has

Specifically, they

The problems my clients have had and have h a d —

15

repeatedly requested from DHL--I f m sorry, from USS, is some

16

sort of substantiation of whether amount as actually paid.

17

What was the actual exchange?

18
19

THE COURT:

Because—

Why do you—why do you need to know

that?

20

MR. NADESAN:

Because the fact is, how do we know

21

that a payment has actually occurred?

22

settlement agreement, it says—and let me give you a copy.

23

you have a copy, your Honor?

24
25

THE COURT:
copies.
"SS^^SSTSSKSSS^^^^ST.
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1

MR, JORDAN:

2

MR- NADESAN:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. NADESAN:

5

THE COURT:

6

looking at.

Somewhere in there.
Well, let m e — l e t me give you one.
No.

I've got it right here.

1

This i s — i n fact, this is what I've been 1

Had a little blue tag right here on it.
Sure.

1

Well, what it says under

9

8

Section 3 is that by entering into the—this agreement, the

9

first sentence of that says:

10

THE COURT:

12

|

By entering into this agreement, 1

the respective Mariposa—

11

|
9

Okay.

MR. NADESAN:

7

1

9

Are you talking Paragraph 3 or Section

3?

1

1

13

MR. NADESAN:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. NADESAN:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. NADESAN:

Section 3.

J

I s — c a n you give me a page number?
Sure.

It's Page 5.

1
1

5?

1
Says by entering into this agreement, I

18

the respective Mariposa franchisees agree to indemnify and

19

hold USS harmless for any and all amounts the USS parties are 1

20

determined to owe DHL through judgment or settlement for DHL

6

21

services provided to the respective franchisees.

1

22

There—there's a little bit extending this.

1

It says fc

23

regardless of whether that determination is by judgment or

1

24

through settlement and regardless of whether the amount is

fi

25

determined through set-off amounts that may reduce any

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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1

judgment in favor of the USS parties against DHL.

2

For the Mariposa franchisees, the key issue is

3

whether USS was determined to owe DHL, through either judgment

4

or settlement for DHL services provided to the respective

5

Mariposa franchisees.

6

judgment in which the amount that they were determined to owe

7

was entered.

8

isn't--isn't a factor here.

9

USS parties are determined to owe DHL through settlement for

Now, what's clear is that there was no

It's clear that -that—that the judgment issue
What it is, is the amount that

10

DHL services provided; however, the issue is at this point,

11

they basically—there's a heat€*d—this is the result o f — t h e

12

settlement agreement is the result of a heated dispute between

13

the parties and they basically walked up to my clients and

14

said, well, just take our word, we paid DHL the full amount.

15

And our clients have said, well, please provide us

16

some sort of substantiation.

And what they've said is, well,

17

we'll get o u r — o u r accounting books; however, their accounting

18

books don't show whether they actually made a payment to DHL

19

or not.

20

the DHL, their litigation with DHL, the amounts that were owed

21

to DHL for services provided, but what it doesn't show is how

22

much they were actually determined to owe DHL as part of their

23

settlement agreement.

What their accounting books show is at the start of

24

And that's what this litigation is about.

25

about o u r — m y client trying to avoid its responsibilities or
i^^^^siirjj.ASo*" «-«&& * # -
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1

delay.

2

their—this complaint for declaratory judgment on July 1st and

3

served USS on July 12th.

4

its arbi—demand for arbitration.

5

In fact, one thing to note is that my client filed

And then on July 13th, USS sent out

In addition—they're not trying to skip out on and

6

steal—or steal USS 1 money because under the very terms of

7

this agreement, they're not obligated to make any payments to

8

USS until their lawsuit in New York is resolved.

9
10
11
12

So the real issue that—that's arisen is, w h a t —
THE COURT:

Where is that referenced in the

settlement agreement?
MR. NADESAN:

It is on Paragraph 3, where it says--

13

it's the last sentence of Paragraph 3 before Section A.

14

what it says is, the parties agree that the Mariposa

15

franchisees shall not be required to make payment to USS under

16

this provision until such time as the franchisee lawsuit is

17

resolved, either through a final, non-appealable judgment or

18

against the Mariposa franchisees or through settlement.

19

And

So this isn't a matter of them trying to take the

20

money and leave town.

21

a determination of what they actually owe USS under the

22

indemnification provision.

23

unwilling or unable to provide some sort of substantiation

24

other than its bald-faced assertions.

25

with that is,, how can USS, on the one hand say, we have a

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188

This is a matter of them trying to make

And the problem is that USS is

But that — the problem

August 19, 2011

Mariposa Express, Inc. v. United Shipping Solutions
Defendants' Motion to Compel Mandatory Arbitration

Page 16
1

confidential agreement, we can't talk about it, we can't

2

disclose it, the other hand, saying, under this confidential

3

agreement, we were determined to owe DHL the full amounts of

4

all the amounts that were in our CAMS system.

5

And so we brought this case, not to dispute the

6

actual amounts, but to find out what is USS 1 burden of proof,

7

what must they do in order to show that there—there actually

8

is a determination of the amount they owe under the settlement

9

agreement.

10

And in fact, one of the items in our complaint is

11

for an injunction requiring them to disclose the actual

12

settlement agreement.

13

they paid the actual amounts, then yes, if the arbitration

14

clause is applicable, then the parties can go into arbitration

15

and decide whether their CAMS data is correct or not; however,

16

what t h e — t h e problem is, is that the settlement agreement

17

doesn't contain this offset for this full amount or doesn't

18

off—document an offset at all.

19

If the settlement agreement shows that

For instance, if the settlement agreement doesn't

20

mention at all the amount that USS is determined to owe DHL,

21

then my clients would have no obligation to pay DHL anything

22

under the settlement agreement,.

23

says that there — that they have to pay a fifty percent offset, |j

24

so I think DHL was asking for approximately $6 million and

25

there was a dispute between the parties in the exact amounts
73SSE
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owed.

2

part of the settlement agreement, then my clients would be

3

only be obligated to pay fifty percent of the amounts in this

4

CAMS database.

5

Now, if DHL says—will pay us $3 million in offset as

So the issue is not one of whether the parties are

6

fighting about what's in the CAMS database, it's at i s s u e —

7

it's a more—it's a larger issue than that, specifically, it's

8

the issue of whether USS paid anything or is determined—more

9

accurately, is determined to owe anything to DHL for services

10

provided to my clients under the settlement agreement.

11

Now, USS has made the case that any dispute,

12

including the more global dispute about whether they were

13

determined to owe anything on the settlement agreement, is

14

covered by the arbitration clause.

15

case,

16

ambiguities or there's a dispute about the meaning of the

17

arbitration clause, it favors arbitration.

18

also says is that it cannot — a party cannot be forced to

19

arbitration where it hasn't agreed to it.

I don't think that's the

Utah law favors arbitration and where there are

However, what it

20

And so we have to look at the agreement to determine

21

what exactly the Mariposa—Mariposa group agreed to arbitrate.

22

What they agreed to arbitrate—well, they—first of all, they

23

agreed to arbitration under two circumstances.

24

if a judgment was entered in USS in favor of DHL.

25

that that has never happened, there was never a judgment,

.
DepomaxMerit Litigation
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1
2

there was a settlement.

1

Number two, it says if there is a settlement, the

1

3

Mariposa franchisees—and let me read this so I'm n o t — n o t

1

4

misrepresenting--

1

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. NADESAN:

Where are you at?
Paragraph 3(A).

Paragraph (A)?

1

It says, i f — t h e

1

7

parties agree that if DHL and the USS parties desire to

|

8

resolve the DHL lawsuit through settlement, the USS parties

1

9

shall provide the Mariposa franchisees with access to the CAMS 1

10

data necessary to show the DHL services provided to the

E

11

Mariposa franchisees or their customers.

1

12

do not agree with the amount identified by the USS parties,

1

13

the USS parties shall nevertheless have the right to proceed

|

14

with the settlement and any dispute between the USS parties

1

15

and the Mariposa franchisees concerning these amounts shall be 1

16

resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution procedures

1

17

set forth in Paragraph 1(C) above.

I

If the franchisees

I

18
19

prior to aWhat
settlement,
USS in
will
contact Mariposa,
say--the
that says,
my understanding
of it,
is that

|

20

Mariposa franchisees, say we're going to settle this, but in

;

21

order to settle it, to determine whether there's going to be

22

an offset of fifty percent, whether they're paying the entire

23

amount, what the exact amount of that settlement determination >

24

is going to be, we'd like to make sure you check our books and -

25

you tell us how—whether those books are correct.

•i

v

|
14
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1

The Mariposa franchisees then say yes, your books

2

are correct, or they say, no, we think your books are not

3

correct.

4

to go settle it anyway, but we'll decide afterwards whether

5

our books are correct or not.

At that point, USS goes and says, well, we're going

6

What this doesn't mention is w h a t — i s the issue

7

raised on the first page of--sorry--the first sentence of

8

Paragraph 3, which is the indemnification amount.

9

amounts, as it says here, that refers just to the CAMS data,

10

These

not to the determination of t h e — o f what USS owes DHL.

11

As a result, we think that, first of all, it's

12

entirely possible that the arbitration provision doesn't even

13

apply now because USS concedes that prior to entering into

14

settlement with DHL, it never informed Mariposa of the

15

settlement, it never provided them with the CAMS data,

16

Mariposa never disputed that amount because it never had the

17

opportunity to prior to that settlement.

18

Now the settlement has happened, USS has come in and

19

it said, well, here's the amount that we paid, it's the same

20

as in our CAMS system, that's how much you owe us.

21

that places us in a difficult spot because we don't know

22

whether--what the determination was as part of that settlement

23

agreement.

24
25

But again,

Now, the other issue that arises is, what 1(C)
actually says.

Now, 1(C), if we turn to that, your Honor, is,

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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1

first of all is 1(C), as you can read in the first sentence,

2

was not intended to fully apply to Paragraph 3, because it

3

starts that the parties agree that any dispute regarding the

4

freight payments will be fully and finally resolved

5

exclusively by binding arbitration.

6

However, as a piece of background, the freight

7

payments resolved—referred there are not to Paragraph 3, it's

8

actually to Paragraph 1.

9

that Paragraph 1 define what freight payments are.

If you turn to Page 2, you'll see
So, that

10

first sentence does not apply—that first sentence of

11

Paragraph 1(C) does not apply to Paragraph 3.

12

Paragraph 3 says is that the procedures in 1(C) will apply.

13

And then I think it's important to see what those

Instead, what

14

procedures are in terms of determining the extent of this

15

arbitration procedure.

16

USS and--sorry, 1(C)(1).

17

are unable to resolve any dispute regarding the amount owed by

18

a Mariposa franchisee under Section 1(A) above, the parties

19

will--USS will deliver a dispute notice, then the parties

20

shall submit the matter to binding arbitration before one

21

forensic accountant who shall review the parties'

22

documentation and establish the amount owed to USS, if any, on

23

any disputed invoices.

24
25

And specifically what 1(C) says is, if
If USS and any Mariposa franchisee

As a result, it's clear that this is just talking
about the CAMS data.

''J^™}'^SSS^^^^S^&^^<^kWa**«,.

It's--it ! s specifically the parties will

*t®&m*k-•&*<>->-•-*•* tw;.«;^,«v£?!!8H5r?L;JJ&«$^&SSK>

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188

August 19, 2011

Mariposa Express, Inc. v. United Shipping Solutions
Defendants' Motion to Compel Mandatory Arbitration

Page 21
1

look at the CAMS data, they will see whether there are any

2

disputed invoices in the CAMS data and then they will hand

3

those disputed invoices to a forensic accountant and that

4

forensic accountant will determine whether the invoices

5

contain errors or not.

6

And then he will render a decision.,

What it doesn't say is that the forensic accountant

7

is going to make a determination or is going to make a

8

judgment on how much the USS parties are determined to owe DHL

9

through judgment or settlement.

10
11

And that is the essence of

what we've asked today.
And another example of the fact that this entire,

12

rather lengthy settlement agreement is not determined by that

13

arbitration provision, you can look at Paragraph 6.

14

Paragraph 6 is, is a default provision.

15

the last two sentences of Paragraph 6—sorry, Section 6.

16

says the Mariposa franchise—franchisees agree that upon

17

default, they shall have no further rights to cure the default

18

after expiration of the cure period and may only oppose the

19

entry of judgment on the grounds that no default occurred,

20

All other defenses and equity of law are waived.

21

says here, if you read the whole paragraph is that the

22

Mariposa franchisees sign confessions of judgment and then USS

23

was allowed to enter those confessions of judgment if there's

24

a default; however, in the court system as opposed to

25

arbitration, the Mariposa franchisees are allowed to contest

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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1

whether or not they were in default.
Again, it f s another example that the parties did not

2
3

expect or intend that this entire agreement was governed by

4

arbitration laws.

5

whether the CAMS database numbers are correct or not.

6

here, what we've asked for in our first cause of action is the

7

Court to interpret what this determined to owe DHL through

8

settlement or judgment language means and more specifically,

9

what USS needs to do to establish its burden of proof.

10

Instead, the only thing to be governed is
But

Our second cause of action was whether procedures

11

defined in 1(A) are applicable.

12

moot issue because USS fairly concedes that 1(A) is not

13

applicable; however, in correspondence to us, they had said

14

that.

15

It appears now that that is a

The third cause of action is actually what we're

16

deciding today, which is, is 1(C) applicable to the issue of

17

determining whether—of this determination of liability or is

18

it just for looking at the CAMS database.

19

deciding the burden —

So we're actually

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. NADESAN:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR, NADESAN:

24

And so we're—we're doing number three today because

25

Liability?
Be — o n the —
You mean on the indemnification?
On the indemnification.

that was o u r — o u r request in number three, is — is 1(C)
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1

applicable to determining our liability under the

1

2

indemnification provision or just to whether the CAMS figures

1

3

are correct or not?

8

THE COURT:

Well, when you say liability, are you

1

5

telling me that what you're asking the Court to find is the

1

6

amount of the--

1

4

7

MR. NADESAN:

8

THE COURT:

9

N o — w e l l , it's either the a m o u n t —
I mean, you can say you're liable,

you've agreed to indemnify.

10

MR. NADESAN:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. NADESAN:

S
1

Well, that's correct, your Honor.
So now the question is, how much?
Exactly, your Honor.

1

And what we're

1
1
1

14

|
1
asking the Court to determine where this arbitration provision 1

15

first in to the grand scheme of the agreement.

16

about the amounts in the CAMS database or is it about the

1

17

entire—about the amount of the liability?

1

13

asking for is, what does U S S — w e l l , first of all, 1(C) is

Is it just

|

Because as I've explained to you, the amount of the 1

18
19

liability and the amount on the CAMS database can be

20

different.

21

is to actually have USS provide some sort of substantiation of 1

22

what it was determined to owe under the settlement agreement. 1

23
24
25

1

The only way to find out whether they're the same 1

THE COURT:

So what do you think they're asking in

terms of the arbitration?
MR. NADESAN:
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1

arbitration and determine the amount of liability.

2

THE COURT:

Each franchise owes; right?

3

MR, NADESAN:

They're—what they've said to us, your

4

Honor, is that take us at our word, under the settlement

5

agreement, we paid the amounts in the CAMS database.

6

the CAMS database—the amounts in the CAMS database, you can

7

contest whether that amount is correct or not, but that's what

8

you owe.

9

owe under the liability provision.

And so

And what we're saying is, no, that is not what we
What we owe under the

10

liability provision is the amount that you were determined to

11

owe on behalf of each of individual franchisee under the

12

settlement agreement.

13

provide us an affidavit from DHL, provide us with some

14

substantiation.

So, show us the settlement agreement,

15

And what we're asking the Court to d o -

le

THE COURT:

17

Well, does that not need to be part and

parcel of any arbitration?

18

MR- NADESAN:

19

THE COURT:

20

know that information?

21

MR. NADESAN:

No.

Because—

Wouldn't the forensic accountant need to

No.

Because—your Honor, because

22

under this, the forensic accountant is only determining

23

whether the CAMS data is accurate.

24
25

And to give a little bit of background, the issue
that arose in the earlier trial was that the CAMS information
^T^f^SmHS^SS
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was not accurate, that there were mistakes i n — a n d errors in

2

terms of the charges that USS was billing the franchisees.

3

So the CAMS data and the analysis of the CAMS data

4

is to analyze whether the CAMS invoices are in fact, correct,

5

whether those amounts need to be adjusted because they 1 re

6

billing errors and discrepancies and payments were not

7

properly applied to the CAMS data.

8

determining from going—that f s a separate leap from going to

9

the CAMS data represents the amount of the indemnification

But that's separate from

10

obligation, because the indemnification is tied to the

11

settlement agreement.

12

And if the Court does find that, then it—well, then

13

we need to go into arbitration and then the arbi—the forensic

14

accountant needs to look at the settlement agreement or some

15

sort of substantiation, but what we've asked the Court to do

16

is interpret the agreement to determine what the burden of

17

proof on USS is to establish that—that there was a

18

determination in the settlement that monies—amounts were

19

owed.

20

determination, the CAMS data is simply enough.

21

And what they said is, we don f t need to make that

And that's what we're saying is outside the bounds

22

of the arbitration.

23

the contract, simply to look at documentation and determine

24

whether the CAMS amounts are correct or not.

25

THE COURT:

The arbitrator was not meant to interpret

Okay.
T"3!BtSM
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1
2

MR. JORDAN:

Well, your Honor, maybe I can put this

to rest right now,

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. JORDAN:

You could do that.
Yeah.

Counsel has not accurately

5

interpreted our position.

We're certainly not saying that the

6

arbitrator is restricted to looking at the CAMS data.

7

not saying that the arbitrator can't look at the settlement

8

agreement.

9

how much is owed.

We're

We're not saying that the arbitrator can't decide
All the questions he says that he wants to

10

have determined, we acknowledge the arbitrator has the

11

jurisdiction to decide.

12

Because the--the language here is any dispute and as

13

y o u r — a s your Honor correctly noted, it's any dispute over any

14

amount.

15

amount; if they say it's fifty percent, that's a dispute over

16

the amount.

17

dispute over the amount.

18

arbitrator.

19

So if they say it's zero, that's a dispute over the

If we say it's a hundred percent, that's a
That's all in front of the

And will the arbitrator have to look at the

20

settlement agreement?

21

produce it.

22

I have to produce it in response to a subpoena?

23

the ar--things the arbitrator will rule on, but I presume I

24

will.

25

Sure.

Right now, I can't voluntarily

Can they subpoena it from me?

Absolutely.

That's one of

All right?
They've had their litigation going in New York.
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1

I've said to them in their litigation in New York, I've said

1

2

to counsel, counsel, subpoena it from me so that I--I can

1

3

produce it consistent with the—with the confidentiality

1

4

provision of the settlement agreement.

5

from me, I can't imagine why not.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. JORDAN:

They won't subpoena it 1

But I--

fi

I can't either.

1

— I ' m talking about all these disputes 1

8

and--and their statement to the Court that the—that the

8

9

arbitrator is in some way restricted to looking at the CAMS

I

10

data is not consistent with Paragraph 1(C).

1

11

mention CAMS data.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. JORDAN:

It doesn't even

&
Huh-uh (negative).

1

n

CAMS data is not even in Paragraph

1

14

1(C).

15

arbitration before one forensic accountant who shall review

1

16

the parties' documentation, whatever documentation, doesn't

1

17

restrict it, they can submit whatever they want as

1

18

documentation and establish the amount owed.

19

can submit any documentation they want, including the

1

20

settlement agreement and the arbitrator will establish the

1

21

amount owed, if any.

1

22

authority, it couldn't be broader and we agreed to submit any 1

23

dispute as to any amount to the arbitrator under that clause. J

It says the parties shall submit the matter to binding 1

24

MR. NADESAN:

25

THE COURT:

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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That's it.

That's the scope of this arbitration

Your Honor?
Uh-uh.

He gets the last say.

They 1

1
1
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1

MR. NADESAN:

2

THE COURT:

3

Well, to be quite honest with everybody, I didn't

Okay,

1

The way it works.

1
1

4

read all this stuff, I flipped through it.

5

basically this settlement agreement and that's what I was

1

6

interested in.

1

7

plaintiffs are saying, but I agree with you, Mr. Jordan, I

1

8

think this is broad enough to allow for the kinds of

1

9

information they think they need to see.

10
11

My concern was

And I c a n — I can appreciate what the

1

I would suggest they i

subpoena that settlement agreement so they have it.
And I'm going to dismiss the case without prejudice

II
1

12

and order—order that it—that you engage in arbitration to

1

13

determine the amounts owed.

1

14

MR. JORDAN:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. JORDAN:

17

THE COURT:

If any.

1

You can prepare an order to that effect. 1
I will.

1

I don't think I need to make any

1

So I think as a matter of b

18

findings, it's a motion to dismiss.

19

law, that's the way I see and-~and read this--this agreement

!

20

to engage in arbitration.

1

u

21

MR. JORDAN:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. JORDAN:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. JORDAN:

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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I'll prepare the order.
Okay.
Thank you, your Honor.
It's without prejudice so...
Thank you for your time today.
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1

THE COURT:

You're welcome.

Thank you,
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David J. Jordan (1751)
djjordan@stoel.com
Cameron L. Sabin (9437)
clsabin@stoel.com
Joseph W.Loosle (12154)
jloosle@stoel. com
STOEL RIVES LLP
201 S Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)328-3131

***.

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARIPOSA EXPRESS, INC, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED SHIPPING SOLUTIONS,
LLC; USS LOGISTICS, LLC;
ROBERT ROSS; CHARLES DERR,
and JESSE MOORE,
Defendants.

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL
MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND
TO DISMISS OR, ALTERNATIVELY,
STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING
ARBITRATION
Civil No. 110915908
Judge William W. Barrett

On August 19, 2011, this matter came before the Court for hearing on Defendants'
Motion to Compel Mandatory Arbitration and to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Stay Proceedings
Pending Arbitration (the "Motion"), filed by United Shipping Solutions, LLC, USS Logistics,
LLC, Robert Ross, Charles Derr, and Jesse Moore (collectively, the "USS Parties"). The USS
Parties were represented by David J. Jordan and Joseph W. Loosle of Stoel Rives LLP.
Plaintiffs (collectively, the "Mariposa Group,") were represented by Karthik Nadesan of
Nadesan Beck P.C.

70855919.1 0063437-00013

After considering the memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties in support
of, and in opposition to, the Motion; having listened to and considered the arguments of counsel;
and thus, being fully advised and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT HEREBY
ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Motion is granted. The parties are ordered to arbitrate their dispute in

accordance with the arbitration procedures set forth in Section Lc. of the Settlement Agreement.
2.

The Mariposa Group's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this Y? day of

, Vll/1

,2011.

Judge^illiam % Battetp
t^£>-f
Third Judicial District'G'ovS^udge'
SAL

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
NADESAN BECK P.C.

Ifr

Karthlk fri^san
AttoroetCfor Plaintiffs

70855919.1 0063437-00013
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of August 2011,1 caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND TO
DISMISS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING ARBITRATION
to the following:
Via Email and US mail:

Karthik Nadesan
Ivan LePendu
David Bernstein
Nadesan Beck P.C.
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 841111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

70855919.10063437-00013
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EXHIBIT D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

USS LOGISTICS, LLC, a Utah limited :
liability company; UNITED SHIPPING
SOLUTIONS, LLC, a Utah limited
:
liability company; HERE2THERE WEST,
LLC, a New York limited liability :
company; HERE2THERE EAST, LLC, a
New York limited liability company;:
EASTMAN-HILL ENTERPRISES, LLC, a
Nevada limited liability company; :
FULLERTON INDUSTRIES INC., an Ohio
corporation; UNITED SHIPPING
:
SOLUTIONS OF SEATTLE, LLC, a
Washington limited liability
:
company; PEARL SHIPPING SERVICES,
L.L.C., a Louisiana limited
:
liability company; 10-12 SHIPPING
SERVICES, L.L.C., a Louisiana
:
limited liability company; PGP
OVERNIGHT INC., a New York
corporation; KATANA CORPORATION, a
California corporation, BRAUN
:
RESOURCES, INC., a California
corporation; BRUCE CONREY, an
:
individual; IRON LOGISTICS, LLC, a
Pennsylvania limited liability
:
company; ASTOUNDING LOGISTICS,
INC., a Georgia corporation;
:
PORTLAND WEST SHIPPING, LLC, an
Oregon limited.liability company; :
DELIVERY SOLUTIONS, LLC, an Oregon
limited liability company; GARY
:
E. SMITH, an individual; ELITE
SHIPPING SYSTEMS, LLC, a Utah
:
limited liability company;
EXPEDITED SHIPPING SERVICES, LLC, :
a Nevada limited liability company;
EXPRESS LOGISTICS, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company; POINT TO
POINT LOGISTICS, LLC, a California :
limited liability company; PV

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

080926254

TREE, INC,/ a California corporation;
UNITED SHIPPING SOLUTIONS
SACRAMENTO, a California general
:
partnership; MILE HIGH SHIPPING,
LLC, a Colorado limited liability :
company; THE OUTFIELD GROUP, LLC, a
Missouri limited liability company;:
NAV SHIPPING, LLC, a Maryland
limited liability company; MAREN
:
EQUIPMENT LEASING, INC., a
California corporation; AJ
:
LOGISTICS, INC., a California
corporation; EJ CAPITAL HOLDINGS, :
LLC, a Nevada limited liability
company; KGHI,INC, a Michigan
:
corporation; and ELITE AIR &
FREIGHT, LLC, a Kansas limited
liability company,
j

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DHL EXPRESS (USA), INC., an Ohio
corporation,
Defendant.

:
:

DHL EXPRESS (USA), INC.,
Counterclaim Plaintiff,
vs.

:
5

USS LOGISTICS, LLC, and JOHN DOES
1 through 150,

:

Counterclaim Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on October 4, 2010,
in connection with the following Motions: (1) The "Franchisee's" Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment; (2) defendant DHL Express (USA), Inc.'s

LMt
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

("DHL") Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaims; (3) DHL's
Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Claims; (4) Plaintiffs USS
Logisticsr LLC ("USSL") and United Shipping Solutions, LLC's (^United")
Motion in Limine to Exclude Portions of Dr. Greg Hallman's Report and
Testimony; (5) United/USSL's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of
Damages of Defendant DHL; (6) United/USSL's Motion in Limine to Exclude
Evidence

Related

to the Marioposa

Lawsuit

and Evidence

Regarding

Unasserted Claims; (7) United/USSL's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence
of Certain Claims and Defenses of DHL; (8) DHL's Motion in Limine No. 1
re: Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product
Doctrine; (9) DHL's Motion in Limine No. 2 re: References to other
Resellers; (10) DHL's Motion in Limine No. 3 re; Hank Gibson December 18,
2007, e-mail; (11) DHL's Motion in Limine No. 4 re: Public Relations
Statements Prepared for Project Woodstock; (12) DHL's Motion in Limine
No. 5 re: Post Termination Damages; (13) DHL's Motion to Dismiss Certain
Franchisees for Failure to Prosecute; and (14) United/USSL's Motion to
Strike Addendum to Expert Report of Dr. Greg Hallman Dated September 20,
2010, and Related Testimony.
Following the October 4, 2010, hearing, the parties again appeared
before the Court on October 12, 2010. At the October 12th hearing, the
Court made further inquiries into the legal issues raised in DHL's Motion
for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaims.

At the conclusion of the

ildQ
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Court's dialogue with counsel, it indicated its intent to grant this
Motion and take the remaining Motions under further consideration.
While the Court made certain observations during the dual hearings
mentioned above, it will nevertheless address each parties' Motions
herein.1 The Court notes that since taking this matter under advisement,
it has had an opportunity to review the parties' legal authorities,
rulings from other jurisdictions in cases involving DHL, the parties'
written submissions and counsel's extensive oral argument. Being now
fully informed, the Court rules as stated herein.
At the outset, the Court notes that it will generally address the
Motions in the order in which they were raised during the October 4th oral
argument. Further, because of the number of Motions involved, the Court
will avoid restating the parties' respective legal positions. Finally,
it should be noted that United/USSL's Motion to Strike Addendum to Expert
Report of Dr. Greg Hallman Dated September 20, 2010, has not been fully
briefed,

with

the

filing

of

a

reply

Memorandum

still

pending.

Nevertheless, counsel addressed this Motion at the October 4th hearing,
the Court has had the benefit of reviewing the moving and responding
Memoranda concerning this Motion and will therefore rule on the Motion
herein.

1

DHL's Motion to Dismiss Certain Franchisees will not be addressed because it is
unopposed and has been granted.

USS LOGISTICS V. DHL EXPRESS
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The Court turns to consider the merits of each of the parties'
Motions, beginning with the Franchisee's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.

The Court determines that Paragraph 5 of Amendment No. 1 of

the Reseller Agreement is ambiguous and cannot be construed as a matter
of law based on the four corners of the agreement- Specifically, DHL has
persuaded the Court that a jury needs to consider whether the language
in Paragraph 5 was intended

to merely clarify that USSL would be

permitted to have franchisees resell DHL's services on USSL's behalf or
whether it was indeed intended to grant the Franchisees enforcement
rights against DHL.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered the ruling in
Avail Shipping, Inc. v. DHL Express (USA) , Inc. , a copy of which was
provided to the Court by counsel for the Franchisees.

Counsel had

indicated during oral argument that the court in Avail had ruled that the
franchisees in that case qualified as third-party beneficiaries under
precisely the same language as Paragraph 5 in this case. However, upon
close examination of that case, it appears that

Amendment No. 1 to the

Reseller Agreement in that case was different from the present case in
that it stated: *This Agreement will be extended to United Shipping
Solutions, LLC and their franchisees. . . t% (Emphasis added.)

In this

case, Paragraph 5 uses the term "'franchises, " rather than ^franchisees."
The Court believes that this variation is not a mere distinction without
a difference.

Indeed, counsel for DHL focused on the use of the term

USS LOGISTICS V. DHL EXPRESS
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"franchises" in Paragraph 5 as a basis for his argument that there is no
specific language in Amendment No. l to indicate an express or explicit
intent to make the Reseller Agreement inure to the benefit of the
Franchisees themselves.
Further, the Court is satisfied that the parol evidence cited by the
Franchisees highlights the factual issues regarding the parties' intent
and understanding with respect to the language in Amendment No. 1.

The

differing views on what the language means and at least one deponent's
uncertainty as to the meaning at all, confirms for the Court that these
are

issues which cannot be resolved on a summary judgment basis.

Accordingly, the Franchisees' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
denied.
Next, as indicated at the October 12th hearing, the Court grants
DHL's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaims.

The Court

observes that it is undisputed that DHL continued to provide services to
USSL's customers even after its announcement that it was terminating
domestic shipping services.

it is also undisputed that USSL accepted

these services, but failed to pay for them for a period of time.
Counsel for United/USSL has argued that DHL merely has an offset for
any amounts outstanding because DHL repudiated the Reseller Agreement,
thereby excusing or providing justification for USSL's subsequent failure
to pay. The Court is not persuaded by this line of reasoning and instead
concludes that USSL elected to keep the Reseller Agreement alive despite

452
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the benefits of DHL's shipping

services. Local 659, I.A.T.S.E. v. Color Corp, of America,302 P.2d 294
(Sup.Ct.Cal. 1956).

While USSL may have been the non-repudiating party

to begin with, it ultimately defaulted on the Reseller Agreement by
failing to pay for shipping services rendered in the time frame required,
thereby creating in DHL the right to act upon that default through a
direct breach of contract counterclaim and not merely as a set-off to the
damages allegedly incurred by USSL/United. Silver Air v. Aeronautic Dev.
Corp. , 656 P. Supp. 170, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Taylor v. Johnston,
539 P.2d 425, 430 (Sup.Ct.Cal. 1975)). Again, the Court is not persuaded
that having accepted the benefit of the exchange under the Reseller
Agreement, namely the receipt of shipping services, USSL is excused from
its corresponding obligation of tendering payment as required under that
Reseller Agreement.

USSL's failure in this regard creates liability as

a matter of law, in an amount to be determined at trial. DHL is therefore
entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability under its breach
of contract counterclaim.2

2

The Court notes that DHL's Mot ion i n Limine No. 5 r e : Post Termination
Damages and the p o r t i o n of DHL's Motion for Summary Judgment concerning USSL's
breach of contract counterclaim are inter-related in the sense that USSL's failure to pay DHL's
invoices potentially created the basis for DHL's termination of the Reseller Agreement and, in
turn, potentially precludes USSLfromseeking damages beyond the date of that termination. The
scope of permissible damages under these unique circumstances presents a complex set of issues
which the Court reserves and will address in the context of the parties' proposed jury instructions
on damages.
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However, the Court denies DHL's Motion for Summary Judgment as to
its "account stated" Counterclaims. The elements of these Counterclaims
are clearly in dispute. For instance, it does not appear that there has
been any express acknowledgment by USSL of indebtedness. USSL has merely
acknowledged that Invoices were sent representing amounts claimed to be
owing by DHL.

Also, USSL disputes that the amounts invoiced are

accurate.
The Court next considers DHL's Motion in Limine No. l re: Documents
Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine.

To

reiterate what was discussed in Court, counsel will meet and confer
regarding the documents which are the subject of this Motion and submit
for in camera

review any documents which they cannot agree upon.

The

remaining documents are to be immediately returned to DHL.
Next, the parties addressed DHL's Motion in Limine No. 2 re:
References to Other Resellers.

Upon further reflection, the Court

determines that this Motion is granted and that United/USSL may only
introduce evidence of system-wide issues or glitches with DHL's billing
software and invoicing process, as it pertains to United/USSL's claims
that they were not properly billed in this case.
As to DHL's Motion in Limine No. 3 Re: Hank Gibson December 18,
2007, email, the Court reserves judgment regarding Mr. Gibson's email
pending

the plaintiffs' ability

to

lay

the predicate

foundation,

including how the contents of this email have relevance to the Project
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Motion or require the email to be redacted.
As to United/USSL's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Certain
Claims and Defenses of DHL, the Court denies this Motion.

The Court

determines that DHL did not act wrongfully with respect to providing a
Rule 30(b) (6) witness to testify regarding its affirmative defenses. The
Court is not persuaded by the suggestion that a Rule 30(b) (6) witness is
required to be schooled in the legal concepts surrounding affirmative
defenses and then made to testify regarding the elements and factual
underpinnings of such defenses. Further, to the extent that United/USSL
believed otherwise, it should have raised these issues previously rather
than going directly to seeking sanctions.
As to United/USSL's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Related to
the Marioposa Lawsuit and Evidence Regarding Unasserted Claims, the Court
determines that statements and testimony adduced in the "Mariposa"
lawsuit may be used in the present action for the limited purpose of
impeachment. The Court is not persuaded that such evidence, used in this
limited

purpose,

is

irrelevant

or

prejudicial.

Accordingly,

United/USSL's Motion is denied, as framed, but the evidence is limited
nonetheless in the manner discussed herein.
The Court next considers the dual Motion in Limine and Motion to
Strike concerning portions of Dr. Hallman's report and Addendum. Counsel
for United/USSL persuasively argued that DHL should have presented Dr.

LJSS
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Hallman's opinions regarding DHL's claims of offset and damages as part
of an initial expert report by the August 9, 2010, deadline.

However,

the Court is not persuaded that there has been any actual prejudice,
particularly since it appears that: Dr. Hallman's testimony in this regard
is limited.

In addition, the Addendum appears to merely provide the

supplementation alluded to in Dr. Hallman's original Report.

Finally,

the Court is satisfied that the plaintiffs have had sufficient time to
examine both the Report and Addendum and will, of course, have the
opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Hallman at trial with respect to those
areas of his opinion which they view to be faulty or incorrect. Clearly,
these types of assertions go to the weight of Dr. Hallman's opinions and
not their admissibility.

Accordingly, United/USSL's

Motion in Limine

to Exclude Portions of Dr. Greg Hallman's Report and Testimony and their
Motion to Strike Addendum to Expert Report of Dr. Greg Hallman Dated
September 20, 2010, and Related Testimony are denied.
Next, the Court denies United/USSL's Motion in Limine to Exclude
Evidence of Damages of Defendant DHL:

Foremost, the Court is not

persuaded by United/USSL's position that Ms. Miller
anything" about DHL's claimed damages.

"did not know

Indeed, having reviewed the

entirety of Ms. Miller's testimony, attached as Exhibit L to the Maxfield
Declaration, the Court is satisfied that Ms. Miller provided sufficient
responses, particularly in light of the scope of the identified topics
for her deposition.

Finally, as DHL points out, to the extent that the
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plaintiffs believe that Ms. Miller's testimony is lacking, that is a
matter for cross-examination.
Next, as to DHL's Motion in Limine No. 4 re: Public Relations
Statements Prepared for Project Woodstock, before the Court will permit
the plaintiffs to introduce the statements at issue, they must first
establish how they are relevant to the specific claims of tortious
interference and that they mitigated their damages.

At this juncture,

the probative value of these statements remains unclear and their
prejudicial effect may ultimately be found to outweigh any such value.
• Finally, the Court denies DHL's Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiffs' Claims in the entirety. The Court is not persuaded that the
plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the ADA or the FAAA and is satisfied
that the reasoning in Judge Faust's Memorandum Decision, which reached
the same conclusion, is sound.
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court.
Dated this / C) day of October, 2010.

PAUL G.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

/yc7
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